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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1832 the German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz
asserted that "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse,
with the addition of other means." 2 This sentiment was echoed
over one hundred years later in a similar context but by a very
dissimilar political thinker, the Chinese leader Mao Zedong.3
It can be argued that this kind of logical progression between
politics and war is also present in the relationship that exists
between politics and the law, particularly between politics and
public law, and most especially between politics and constitutional
law.
I will elaborate on this thesis in support of my contention that
the linkage between politics and constitutional law is clearly
apparent in the history and outcome of the Supreme Court's
decisions in the Insular Cases4 and their progeny.5 With the Court
2 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, bk. 8, ch. 6B, at 731 (Michael Howard &
Peter Paret eds. & trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1993) (1832).
3 See 2 MAO TSE-TUNG, On Protracted War, in SELECrED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG 153 (2d prtg. 1967) ("[P]olitics is war without bloodshed while war is
politics with bloodshed.").
4 See generally De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (holding that once Puerto
Rico was acquired by the United States through cession from Spain it was not a
"foreign country" within the meaning of tariff laws); Goetze v. United States, 182
U.S. 221 (1901) (holding that Puerto Rico and Hawaii were not foreign countries
within the meaning of tariff laws); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901)
(holding that the right of the President to exact duties on imports into the United
States from Puerto Rico ceased with the ratification of the peace treaty between
the United States and Spain); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901)
(invalidating tariffs imposed on goods exported from the United States to Puerto
Rico after the ratification of the treaty between the United States and Spain);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (holding that Puerto Rico did not become a
part of the United States within the meaning of Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution); Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901) (holding that a
vessel engaged in trade between Puerto Rico and New York is engaged in the
coasting trade and not foreign trade).
5 Of these, Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), holding that because
Puerto Rico had not been incorporated into the United States -notwithstanding
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echoing the popular sentiments then prevalent, the Insular Cases
translated the salient political dispute of the times, regarding the
acquisition and governance of the foreign territories acquired as a
result of the Spanish-American War of 1898, into the vocabulary of
the Constitution. This Article contends that the Insular Cases are a
display of some of the most notable examples in the history of the
Supreme Court in which its decisions interpreting the Constitution
evidence an unabashed reflection of contemporaneous politics, 6
rather than the pursuit of legal doctrine. 7 There are, of course,
the granting of U.S. citizenship to its residents in 1917- a U.S. citizen living in
Puerto Rico did not have the right to trial by jury, is the most relevant to our
discussion. See also Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (holding that
Alaska was incorporated into the United States by the treaty of acquisition from
Russia and thus the Constitution applied therein); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138 (1904) (holding that the Philippines were not incorporated into the United
States by the treaty of acquisition from Spain and thus there was no constitutional
right to trial by jury therein); Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904) (holding that
after annexation from Spain a resident of Puerto Rico was not an "alien
immigrant" but a U.S. national); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (holding
that Hawaii did not become incorporated into the United States until Congress
enacted the Newlands Resolution); cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search by
U.S. authorities of a Mexican citizen's home in Mexico); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651 (1980) (finding no Fifth Amendment violation by reason of U.S. citizens in
Puerto Rico receiving disparate treatment in the granting of Social Security
benefits); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (same as to Supplemental Security
Income benefits). But see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that civilian
dependents of members of the armed forces who are overseas in times of peace
have a constitutional right to a jury trial and cannot be tried by military tribunals
for capital offenses). To the extent that the Insular Cases stand for the principle
that "the Constitution does not follow the flag," see also Boumediene v. Bush, 476
F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (upholding a statute
which strips federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions of aliens held at
Guantdnamo Bay). But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (holding
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires that an alien held at
Guantanamo Bay be tried by a "regularly constituted court" and not a special
military tribunal created by the Detainee Treatment Act); cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that Congress had authorized the President to detain
citizen enemy combatants at Guantdnamo Bay, but that these combatants are
entitled to a meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual basis of their
detention).
6 When the Insular Cases were decided, a political humorist of the time
quipped, "IN]o matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme
coort follows th' iliction returns." FINLEY PETER DuNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26
(1901).
7 If one accepts the validity of Clausewitz's theorem regarding the extension
of politics and war, and my observation regarding politics and constitutional law,
one is led to the inevitable conclusion that the Insular Cases in effect constitute an
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others. Another conspicuous instance of this socio-political
phenomenon, one that is in fact intimately related to the Insular
Cases and that will be touched upon, is demonstrated by the case of
Plessy v. Ferguson.8 As in the instance of the legal framework
established by Plessy, the Insular Cases have had lasting and
deleterious effects on a substantial minority of citizens. 9 The
"redeeming" difference is that Plessy is no longer the law of the
land, while the Supreme Court remains aloof about the
repercussions of its actions in deciding the Insular Cases as it did,
including the fact that these cases are responsible for the
establishment of a regime of de facto political apartheid, which
continues in full vigor.
This Article argues that the Insular Cases were wrongly decided
because, at the time of their ruling, they squarely contradicted
long-standing constitutional precedent. Their skewed outcome
was strongly influenced by racially motivated biases and by
colonial governance theories that were contrary to American
territorial practice and experience. Further evidence of this
contention, as will be demonstrated, is the discriminatory manner
in which the Supreme Court has thereafter applied the doctrines of
the Insular Cases,l0 even in more modern times." This Article
proposes to establish that the dogma of the Insular Cases constitutes
an outmoded anachronism when viewed within the framework of
present-day constitutional principles and, additionally, that it
contravenes international commitments entered into by the United
States since then, which constitute superceding "Law of the Land."
Ultimately, the present legitimacy of the Insular Cases is untenable.
The system of governance promoted thereunder can no longer be
extension of the politics of the Spanish-American War, something that will
become more apparent when these cases are discussed in more detail, infra.
8 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9 See JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 117-265 (1985) (arguing that the colonial
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico, which was approved by
the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, created unrest and had lasting negative
socioeconomic effects in Puerto Rico).
10 See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (holding that because
Puerto Rico had not been incorporated into the United States, a U.S. citizen living
in Puerto Rico did not have the right to trial by jury).
11 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that a U.S. citizen
accompanying her husband who was in the armed forces overseas cannot be tried
by military court-martial, but is guaranteed indictment by a grand jury and a civil




reconciled with a rule of law in which all citizens are entitled to
equality.
2. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE INSULAR CASES
2.1. The Historical Context
When placed in their historic context, the Insular Cases
represent a constitutional law extension of the debate over the
Spanish-American War of 189812 and the imperialist/manifest
destiny causes which that conflict promoted.13 That war was the
culmination of a national expansionist process that commenced
almost from the day that the War for Independence ended in
1783,14 and proceeded thereafter in predictable progression with
the acquisition, by diverse means, of the continental lands that
were contiguous to the United States as it was variously
configured during the course of the nineteenth century. It was a
process that climaxed in 1848 with the signing of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo,15 which ended the Mexican War, and resulted
12 See generally FRANK FREIDEL, THE SPLENDID LITTLE WAR (1958) (noting that
after Puerto Rico was conquered by American troops many Puerto Ricans
expressed joy at the prospect of joining the United States); IVAN MUSICANT, EMPIRE
BY DEFAULT: THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE DAWN OF THE AMERICAN
CENTURY (1998) (discussing the conscious and strategic measures taken by the
United States in expanding through Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam,
the Panama Canal, and Guantinamo Bay); BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE
INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006) (arguing that the
Supreme Court gave disparate constitutional treatment to inhabitants of United
States territories).
13 See JAMES E. KERR, THE INSULAR CASES: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN
AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM (1982) (discussing the Supreme Court's creation of the
expansionist doctrine that Congress, not the Court, should determine when an
acquired territory becomes part of the union and receives the full benefits of the
Constitution); WILLIAM L. LANGER, THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM 1890-1902 (2d
ed. 1951) (characterizing the period between 1890 and 1902 as dominated by
imperialism and competition for territory); JULIUS W. PRATT, EXPANSIONISTS OF
1898: THE ACQUISITION OF HAWAII AND THE SPANISH ISLANDS (Peter Smith 1959)
(1936) (discussing the various motives, techniques, and propaganda employed by
politicians, journalists, the church, and the military to influence the expansion of
imperialism in 1898 that ultimately resulted in the American acquisition of
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines).
14 See Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51 (1789) (providing the
process by which territories west of the Ohio River would be admitted as states
into the union).
15 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement Between the United
States of America and The United Mexican States, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat.
922 (ending the armed conflict between the United States and Mexico).
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in the annexation by the United States of what are today the states
of California, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and Utah.
With this annexation the territory of the United States within
the continent proper was consolidated within its present contours,
and our borders with Mexico 16 and Canada were permanently
defined. Nevertheless, the political forces17 that had promoted the
expansion from "sea to shining sea" 18 were still restless and looked
for further growth in two geographic areas of obvious interest to
the United States: the Caribbean and the Pacific. A moribund
Spanish Empire presented tantalizing targets of opportunity in
both areas. Thus came about the "splendid little war," 19 known to
us as the Spanish-American War, leading to new additions to the
"American Empire."20
There were, however, important differences between the
territorial acquisitions that preceded the Spanish-American War
and the territories that were annexed as a result of that clash. The
first difference, of course, was geographical in that these new
territories, namely Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, and Guam, 21
were not only noncontiguous with the United States proper but, in
fact, were separated from the mainland by considerable oceanic
16 The Gadsden Purchase in 1853, leading to minor alterations of our border
with Mexico, still remained to be completed.
17 See generally PRATr, supra note 13 (discussing the influence of expansionists
concerned with strengthening U.S. trade prospects, like James G. Blaine, Benjamin
Harrison, and John W. Foster, on the decision to pursue territory in the
Caribbean).
18 Katharine Lee Bates, America the Beautiful, reprinted in AMERICA THE
BEAUTIFUL AND OTHER POEMS 3-4 (1911) (usually sung as a hymn to the tune of
Materna, by Samuel A. Ward).
19 A phrase taken from a letter to Theodore Roosevelt, the quintessential
exponent of manifest destiny expansion, by the United States Ambassador to
Great Britain shortly after the war ended: "It has been a splendid little war; begun
with the highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit,
favoured by that fortune which loves the brave." Letter from John Hay to
Theodore Roosevelt, reproduced in HUGH THOMAS, CUBA: THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM
404 (1971).
20 As first used by Chief Justice Marshall in Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317,
319 (1820), and again by Justice Brown in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 286
(1901). See generally MUSICANT, supra note 12 (providing a comprehensive history
of the Spanish-American War of 1898 and its contributions to the emergence of the
United States as a world power).
21 Acquired from Spain as a result of the Treaty of Paris which ended the
war. See Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom
of Spain, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 (detailing the cession of various




distances.22 This statement is not totally accurate in that Alaska,
which was purchased from Russia in 1867,23 and technically part of
the mainland North American continent, was not physically
connected to United States proper but separated by Canada's
Pacific fringe. By 1898, however, the United States had settled its
differences with Great Britain regarding the Canadian Pacific
territories and thus noncontiguousness was not an issue. The case
of Hawaii is closer to that of the Spanish islands in that it is also a
group of islands several thousand miles from the mainland United
States. Furthermore, its annexation as a result of the Newlands
Resolution of 1898 was contemporaneous with the Spanish-
American War.24
There were, however, other differences that further
distinguished the Spanish-American War acquisitions from those
of Alaska and Hawaii. In the case of the Spanish islands of Puerto
Rico, the Philippines, and Guam, there were almost no United
States citizens residing therein when the change in sovereignty
took place,25 and sub silentio, but perhaps most importantly in the
real-politics of the times, much if not most of the large native
populations inhabiting these islands were non-white. Thus, for the
first time in its history, the United States acquired sovereignty over
noncontiguous lands separated by thousands of miles from the
political and economic epicenter of the American polity, and
inhabited by large numbers of subject peoples of different races,
languages, cultures, religions, and legal systems than those of the
then-dominant Anglo-Saxon society of the United States.
Equally important were two significant but unannounced
reasons for the carrying out of these territorial expansions: the
contemplated economic exploitation of these new territories by the
22 Puerto Rico is approximately 850 miles from Florida, and the Philippine
Islands and Guam are approximately 7,000 and 5,000 miles from the U.S. west
coast, respectively.
23 See Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North
America by His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias to the United States of
America, U.S.-Russ., Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539.
24 See Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the
United States, Res. No. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
25 In the case of Hawaii not only was there a large U.S. expatriate population,
but it was instrumental, as in the case of Texas, in fomenting the local revolution
that led to intervention and eventual annexation by the United States. See PRATT,
supra note 13, at 74-109 (outlining the events in January 1893 that comprised the
"revolution" in Hawaii). Alaska, of course, was almost empty of any significant
population when acquired by the United States.
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ruling metropolises, 26 and the establishment of strategic coaling
and naval bases therein.
27
This set of facts provided the basic ingredients of a typical
European colonial relationship of the late nineteenth century.
Thus, it is not surprising that the ruling groups of the time in the
United States looked to European colonial solutions for these new
American imperial relationships. Nevertheless, because it was for
use by Americans, to whom for historical reasons the term
"colonialism" was anathema, the answer to this conundrum had to
be cloaked in an American constitutional mantle of facial
respectability. The de facto colonial status had to be validated by a
legal regime that would de jure allow the United States to govern
the new lands and their people with a free hand, untethered by the
constitutional constraints that normally restrained the
governmental structures of the continental United States. To this
purpose there came to the aid of the political branches the think-
tanks of the day, principally at Harvard University, but also at
Yale, 28 with what would emerge as the ideological underpinnings
26 As an example, the value of goods sent to Puerto Rico from the United
States increased from $2.8 million in 1892 to $8.7 million in 1901, making it the
fifth largest market for U.S. goods in Latin America and twenty-seventh in the
world, a ranking which went to fourth largest in Latin America and eleventh in
the world by 1910. SPARROW, supra note 12, at 65. In 2006, the value of goods
shipped to Puerto Rico from the United States had increased to $21.98 billion,
making Puerto Rico the second ranking U.S. market in Latin America and twelfth
in the world. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUBL'N No. FT895/06, U.S. TRADE WITH PUERTO
RICO AND U.S. POSSESSIONS 2006: FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS tbl. 1, at A-1 (Mar.
2007).
27 See, e.g., A. T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-
1783, at 83 (13th ed. 1897) ("Colonies... afford ... the surest means of supporting
abroad the sea power of a country.").
28 See, e.g., Elmer B. Adams, The Causes and Results of Our War with Spain from
a Legal Stand-Point, 8 YALE L.J. 119 (1898) (arguing that the acquisition of territories
is undemocratic, yet objecting to statehood for acquired territories on policy
grounds); John Kimberly Beach, Constitutional Expansion, 8 YALE L.J. 225, 234
(1899) (evaluating the constitutionality of U.S. occupation, acquisition, and control
of the Philippines and concluding that acquisition is a "duty" of the United States,
in the name of "the restoration of order and security to life and property in the
Philippines."); William Bradford Bosley, The Constitutional Requirement of
Uniformity in Duties, Imposts and Excises, 9 YALE L.J. 164 (1900) (examining
Congress's power to levy duties, imposts, and excises on the territories newly
acquired from Spain for local, not national, purposes, and arguing that while
Congress can levy taxes for local purposes, the Constitution requires that
Congress also levy taxes on the Territories for national purposes); William W.
Howe, The Law of Our New Possessions, 9 YALE L.J. 379 (1900) (examining the
evolution of Spanish laws that governed Louisiana before U.S. acquisition and
suggested that the civil codes of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines should
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss2/1
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of the Insular Cases and the dogma which I have elsewhere referred
to as the "doctrine of separate and unequal." 29
2.2. The Academic Debate
The academic groupings for a plausible justification for the
retention and governance of the new island territories first came to
light in a series of articles published in 1898-1899 in the Harvard
Law Review.30 They were the precursors of the various theories
later echoed in Congress and, eventually, by the Supreme Court in
the Insular Cases. The basic issue being explored was how these
new territories were to be governed, whether the Constitution
applied therein, and if so, to what extent.
In the first of these articles Carman Randolph argued that, as in
the case of all territorial acquisitions up to that point, not only did
the Constitution apply to these territories with regard to the
not be disturbed, while their criminal legal systems should be modified); Paul R.
Shipman, Webster on the Territories, 9 YALE L.J. 185, 206 (1900) (evaluating
Webster's opinions on the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, referring
to the territories as "incorrigibles," and suggesting that the Constitution be
modified if necessary to control the populations in the territories); Edward B.
Whitney, The Porto Rico Tariffs of 1899 and 1900, 9 YALE L.J. 297 (1900) (evaluating
the right of the U.S. government to levy duties on trade with Puerto Rico and
concluding that Congress must impose import taxes on Puerto Rico).
29 TORRUELLA, supra note 9.
30 See, e.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the
Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV.
393, 412 (1899) (arguing that the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines
was constitutional, stating that Congress could establish governments therein
once the treaty with Spain is ratified, but also stating that there were several open
questions including "[w]hether Puerto Rico can be held permanently and
avowedly as a colonial dependence"); C. C. Langdell, The Status of Our New
Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365, 371 (1899) (discussing the definition and scope of
the term "United States," and arguing that while the term might encompass the
Territories, "the use of the word . . . has . . . no legal or constitutional
significance."); Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions: A Third
View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155 (1899) (examining the legal status of territories
acquired by conquest or cession, and differentiating between territory acquired
with the intention of incorporating it into the United States and territory acquired
without that purpose, and stating that constitutional rights do not apply to
territory acquired without that purpose); Carman F. Randolph, Constitutional
Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1898) (arguing that the Constitution
applies to Filipinos, and that because upon annexation Filipinos owed allegiance
to the United States, that they ought to be considered citizens); James Bradley
Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464, 484 (1899) (discussing the
constitutional powers over the newly acquired Hawaii and Philippines and
urging caution with respect to settling the territorial fate of the Philippines, but
less caution with respect to Hawaii).
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personal rights of their inhabitants, but furthermore, because these
peoples upon annexation owed allegiance to the United States,
they automatically became citizens of this nation.31 As authority
for these propositions Randolph relied on two Supreme Court
decisions: Loughborough v. Blake32 and the Dred Scott case.
33
In Loughborough the question presented was whether Congress
had the power to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia.
The answer to that question depended on the more immediate
issue of whether the Constitution and its Uniformity Clause34
applied in the District of Columbia, a territory, and thus a non-
state. As we shall see below, this issue is in all respects precisely
the question later decided in the key Insular Case of Downes v.
Bidwell.35 In Loughborough, Chief Justice Marshall answered this
query thus:
Does [the] term [United States] designate the whole, or any
particular portion of the American empire? Certainly this
question can admit of but one answer. It is the name given
to our great republic, which is composed of States and
territories. The district of Columbia, or the territory west of
the Missouri, is not less within the United States, than
Maryland or Pennsylvania [and thus the Constitution
applies] .36
Chief Justice Marshall was thus patently clear in his view that
the Constitution applied to all of the "American empire,"
regardless of whether it involved a state or territory, as in the case
of the District of Columbia.
In Dred Scott, discredited for other reasons, the question before
the Court was whether an act of Congress prohibiting slavery in
the Territory of Missouri was a proper exercise of congressional
power under the Territorial Clause37 of the Constitution, a
31 Randolph, supra note 30, at 299-301.
32 18 U.S. 317 (1820).
33 Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
34 "[AIll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States .. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
35 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
36 Loughborough, 18 U.S. at 319.
37 "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the




provision which lies at the heart of the theoretical basis of the
Insular Cases. In ruling that Congress lacked such authority, Chief
Justice Taney wrote:
[Pilaintiff has laid much stress upon that article in the
Constitution which confers on Congress the power "to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States;" but, in the judgment of the court, that
provision has no bearing on the present controversy... and
was intended to be confined, to the territory which at that
time [of its independence from Great Britain] belonged to,
or was claimed by, the United States... and can have no
influence upon a territory afterwards acquired from a
foreign Government. It was a special provision for a
known and particular territory, and to meet a present
emergency, and nothing more.38
Perhaps of greater importance to the fundamental issues raised
by the continued vigor of the Insular Cases are the further
comments of Chief Justice Taney, which unfortunately have
become lost in the aftermath of this otherwise disfavored opinion:
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the
Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies
bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled
and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its
territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of
new States .... [N]o power is given to acquire a Territory
to be held and governed [in a] permanently [colonial]
character ....
[C]itizens of the United States who migrate to a
Territory belonging to the people of the United States,
cannot be ruled as mere colonists, dependent upon the will
of the General Government, and to be governed by any
laws it may think proper to impose.39
38 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 432.
39 Id. at 446-47.
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It is nothing short of ironic that Dred Scott is remembered only
for the negative proposition that the Missouri Compromise,
prohibiting the extension of slavery to a territory, was a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, when in fact its basic
holding was to the effect that the Constitution fully applied in a
territory to the same extent as in the states, a holding that was in
consonance with Chief Justice Marshall's ruling in Loughborough.
In an attempt to refute Randolph's endorsement of this
constitutional logic, an article by Professor Christopher Columbus
Langdell sought to minimize Chief Justice Marshall's language in
Loughborough as mere dicta. Langdell reasoned that the
Constitution applied to the District of Columbia because the
District was created from states, where the Constitution had
already attached, and thus "it may not be easy to show that it has
ever ceased to extend over it."40 He argued that application of the
Bill of Rights to the newly acquired lands was inapposite because:
"these ten amendments as a whole are so peculiarly and so
exclusively English that an immediate and compulsory application
of them to ancient and thickly settled Spanish colonies would
furnish as striking a proof of our unfitness to govern dependencies,
or to deal with alien races... ."41 Later echoed in the Insular Cases,
this racist rhetoric would become a significant component of the
mantra running throughout these cases and their progeny. 42
Although taking sides with Randolph, an article by Judge
Simeon E. Baldwin placed its emphasis on the Dred Scott decision,
arguing that the territorial clause did not grant Congress authority
to "rule ... without restriction, as a colony or dependent province,
[because that] would be inconsistent with the nature of our
40 Langdell, supra note 30, at 383.
41 Id. at 386.
42 See RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF
RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1983-1946, at 15 (1972)
("Those who advocated overseas expansion faced this dilemma: What kind of
relationship would the new peoples have to the body politic? Was it to be the
relationship of the Reconstruction period, an attempt at political equality for
dissimilar races, or was it to be the Southern 'counterrevolutionary' point of view
which denied the basic American constitutional rights to people of color? The
actions of the federal government during the imperial period and the relegation of
the Negro to a status of second-class citizenship indicated that the Southern point
of view would prevail. The racism which caused the relegation of the Negro to a





government." 43 Writing as he was before the ratification by the
Senate of the Treaty of Paris, Baldwin was of the view that
although it might be unwise "[t]o give the half-civilized Moros of
the Philippines, or the ignorant and lawless brigands that infest
Puerto Rico" 44 the benefits of the Constitution, this was inevitable
in the event of annexation. Although annexation was a purely
political decision, once it was accomplished, the Constitution
would "follow the flag" ex propio vigore.
In the fourth academic sally, Professor James Bradley Thayer,
in an article singularly lacking in any reference to supporting
authorities, minced no words in asserting that "America [should
not] forget her precedence of teaching nations how to live."45
Reflecting a belief that was dear to the hearts of manifest destiny
exponents of the time,46 Thayer argued that "there is no lack of
power in our nation, - of legal, constitutional power, to govern
these islands as colonies, substantially as England might govern
them." 47 Cavalierly disposing of Marshall's and Taney's opinions
as mere dicta, he concluded that not only did the Constitution not
cover the territories, but also that, "except as to one or two
particulars, [the power of Congress to govern the territories was] to
be measured only by the terms of the cessions which it has
accepted, or of the treaty under which a territory may have come
43 Baldwin, supra note 30, at 401.
44 Id. at 415.
45 Thayer, supra note 30, at 466. To be clear, Thayer was not suggesting that
the application of U.S. constitutional law to the territories would help in "teaching
nations how to live." Id. Rather, Thayer's was a condescending point of view
reminiscent of Kipling's contemporary poem about the "white man's burden."
See Rudyard Kipling, The White Man's Burden, MCCLURE'S MAG., Feb. 1899
("[S]erve your captives' need; / To wait, in heavy harness, / On fluttered folk and
wild - / Your new-caught sullen peoples, / Half devil and half child.").
46 See John Fiske, Manifest Destiny, 70 HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG. 578
(1885) (explaining that the civilization of societies depends on "the general
diminution of warfare," and that ultimately, such a diminution is made possible
only by the integration of small political groups into larger groups); see also Julius
W. Pratt, John L. O'Sullivan and Manifest Destiny, 14 NEW YORK HISTORY 213, 221
(1933) (discussing O'Sullivan's contributions to Democratic Review and the
development of the notion of "manifest destiny," which "was a perfect expression
of the current enthusiastic belief in American democracy and in the mission of the
United States to carry it throughout the North American continent"); THOMAS,
supra note 19, at 211 (explaining that O'Sullivan "coined the phrase 'manifest
destiny' to describe the expectation that the U.S., thanks to the superior qualities
of the Anglo-Saxons as such.., and to their democratic institutions, would
inevitably absorb their neighbors").
47 Thayer, supra note 30, at 467.
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in." 48 Beyond these restraints the territories were "subject to the
absolute power of Congress." 49 As we shall see, this was a
viewpoint that was to gain adherents in high judicial circles.
One last article in the Harvard Law Review, written by Abbott
Lawrence Lowell, would most influence the outcome of the Insular
Cases. In addition to being the most scholarly of these articles, it
also provided the nomenclature for the legal theory that finally
prevailed. Although expanding on Thayer's proposal regarding
the texts of the treaties of cession, Lowell rejected Thayer's view
that these documents established the rights of the inhabitants of the
annexed lands, arguing instead that the treaties determined the
relationship of the territories to the United States, and that it was this
relationship that would determine what rights were possessed by
the inhabitants under the Constitution.5 0 After analyzing all of the
territorial acquisitions, from the Articles of Confederation to the
treaty of cession of Alaska, Lowell concluded that the reason the
Constitution had been applied ex propio vigore was because the
treaties of acquisition provided for the incorporation of these
territories into the Union.
2.3. A Change of Venue: The Political Scenario
In 1899, toward the end of the academic debate, a report was
filed by the Carroll Commission, which was formed by President
McKinley to study conditions in Puerto Rico. The Commission
took for granted that Puerto Rico would become an integral part of
the United States, destined for statehood.51  The report was
principally based on the first-hand observations gathered during
the course of an extensive visit to Puerto Rico by the Commission's
chairman, Henry Carroll. It was highly favorable to Puerto Rico
48 Id. at 480.
49 Id.
50 See Lowell, supra note 30, at 170 ("It may be suggested that these provisions
[in the treaties for the cession of Louisiana and Florida] were not meant to confer
any immediate rights upon the inhabitants of the country ceded, but were
intended merely to provide for the admission of States to be formed out of that
country in the future.").
51 See HENRY K. CARROLL, REPORT ON THE ISLAND OF PORTO Rico 58-64 (1899)
(maintaining that the existing institutions and laws of Puerto Rico did not
demand drastic reform, only modification, and that therefore the "Constitution
and laws of the United States" should be extended to the territory). But the
military governor of Puerto Rico at the time, Gen. George W. Davis, was of the
view that "[t]he people of [Puerto Rico] have no conception of political rights




and its inhabitants. Carroll concluded that the island's people
possessed the qualities necessary to develop a "high type of
citizenship" 52 and he had no hesitation in affirming that the people
had "good claims to be considered capable of self government."5 3
He further recommended that territorial status be given to Puerto
Rico, with an organized government and the necessary requisites,
as in the case of other territories.
President McKinley's annual message to Congress in December
1899 echoed the Commission's sentiments, and as a result Senator
Joseph B. Foraker introduced a bill to grant Puerto Ricans
citizenship and to establish a civil government for the island.5 4 The
debate that ensued in Congress as a result of Senator Foraker's
proposal set the stage for the events leading to the Insular Cases.
Unfortunately for Puerto Rico and its inhabitants, shortly after
the President's message and the introduction of the Foraker Bill, a
sea change took place in the administration's views toward Puerto
Rico that had little to do with Puerto Rico itself. The issue was the
Philippines, where a major insurrection broke out when the
Filipinos learned that the United States had unilaterally decided to
annex the archipelago against the wishes of a substantial portion of
the native Filipino population, many of whom had already been
fighting a protracted war for independence against Spain. During
the ensuing struggle, which lasted from 1899 until 1902, the United
States suffered several thousand more casualties than it did during
the entire Spanish-American War, while an untold number of
Filipino civilians were killed or injured, in addition to the major
losses suffered by the Filipino economy.55
The congressional debates surrounding the Foraker Bill
reflected the divided views that were debated throughout the
nation. Concerned about the future implications of granting
citizenship, Congressman Newlands of Nevada stated that he
objected to:
[T]he establishment of a precedent which [would] be
invoked to control our action regarding the Philippines
52 CARROLL, supra note 51, at 57.
53 Id.
54 S. 2264, 56th Cong., 33 CONG. REC. 702 (1900).
5 See generally BRIAN McALLISTER LINN, THE PHILIPPINE WAR: 1899-1902 (2000)
(advocating a new interpretation of the Philippine War that considers the
multitude of competing factors and the high degree of complexity involved in
explaining the motives and ultimate outcome of the war).
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later on; such action, embracing not simply one island near
our coast, easily governed, its people friendly and peaceful
[i.e., Puerto Rico], but [rather] embracing an archipelago of
seventeen hundred islands 7,000 miles distant, of diverse
races, speaking different languages, having different
customs, and ranging all the way from absolute barbarism
to semicivilization.5 6
To this statement, Congressman Jacob H. Bromwell responded,
"We propose, in this way, to establish a precedent for the Filipinos,
the unruly and disobedient, by disciplining and punishing Puerto
Rico, the well-behaved and well-disposed." 57  Congressman
George B. McClellan of New York, perhaps under the influence of
the articles by Randolph and Baldwin, argued that "Puerto Rico
belongs to us .... It is a part of the United States; the Constitution
extends over it; its territory is our territory; its people are our
citizens.... The case of Puerto Rico is very different from that of
the Philippines .... ",58 The racist viewpoint was openly raised by
Congressman Thomas Spight of Mississippi:
How different the case of the Philippine Islands, 10,000
miles away .... The inhabitants are of wholly different
races of people from ours-Asiatics, Malays, negroes, and
mixed blood. They have nothing in common with us and
centuries can not assimilate them.... They can never be
clothed with the rights of American citizenship nor their
territory admitted as a State of the American Union... .59
Senator Bate of Tennessee referred to Filipinos as
"physical []weaklings of low stature, with black skin, closely
curling hair, flat noses, thick lips, and large, clumsy feet,"60 and
warned his colleagues in Congress: "[B]eware of those mongrels of
the East, with breath of pestilence and touch of leprosy. Do not let
them become a part of us with their idolatry, polygamous creeds,
and harem habits. Charity begins at home, Mr. President, and let
us beware!"61
56 33 CONG. REC. 1994 (1900).
57 Id. at 2043.
58 Id. at 2067.
59 Id. at 2105.
60 Id. at 3613 (citing a report of the Philippine Commission to the President).




Although the Foraker Bill was approved finally on April 12,
1900, it was not until major amendments had been made to the
original bill, including the deletion of the citizenship provisions for
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. As approved, the Foraker Act,
which became known in Puerto Rico as the "Organic Act,"
provided for the establishment of a civil government composed of
a presidentially-appointed governor, a supreme court, and an
upper house of an elected bicameral territorial legislature.62
Importantly, the Act also established a tax on goods imported into
Puerto Rico from the mainland United States that was to be used to
meet the expenses of the new territorial government. 63 As in
Loughborough, it was litigation regarding the imposition of this tax
that led to the Insular Cases.
But first came the national elections of 1900. One of the issues
fueling this political contest was the future status of the island
colonies. 64  President McKinley, the Spanish-American War
president, ran for reelection with "Rough Rider" Theodore
Roosevelt, the Spanish-American War hero and quintessential
manifest destiny standard-bearer, as his vice-presidential running
mate.65 The presidential candidate of the Democrats, William
Jennings Bryan, ran on a platform that opposed the acquisition of
the Spanish islands. Bryan was thoroughly trounced in what many
considered to be a national plebiscite approving the annexations of
these lands. 66
Thus, on the eve of the Insular Cases being argued before the
62 Foraker Act, ch. 191, § 4, 31 Stat. 77, 81-82, 84 (1900).
63 See id. at 78 (1900) (establishing that taxes and duties collected in Puerto
Rico would be "placed at the disposal of the President to be used for the
government and benefit of Porto Rico").
64 See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Insular Cases, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 500 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005)
(contending that the Supreme Court "echo[ed] the popular sentiment" by
"translat[ing] the political dispute into the vocabulary of the Constitution").
65 See Walter LaFeber, The Election of 1900, in 3 HISTORY OF AMERICAN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1789-1968, at 1878 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. et al. eds.,
1971) (discussing McKinley's platform in the election of 1900).
66 See Pratt, supra note 64, at 500 ("[Tihe acquisition of foreign territories,
received overwhelming popular endorsement in the presidential election of
1900."). But see Thomas A. Bailey, Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on
Imperialism?, 24 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 43, 45-46 (identifying Bryan's support of
the silver standard, rather than the gold standard, as the primary cause of his
defeat in the 1900 elections rather than McKinley's belief in imperialism, as many
anti-imperialists voted for McKinley due to a fear of economic chaos that could
result from implementation of the silver standard).
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Supreme Court, the nation was divided on the proper status of
Puerto Rico. On one side were those of the view that the
inhabitants of the new territories were unfit to become citizens or
to be integrated in a path towards eventual statehood, a position
that was largely racially motivated and fueled by Filipino-phobia.
On the other side were those who adhered to the century-old
tradition and practice that the Constitution automatically attached
to all territories over which the United States gained sovereignty,
and brought with it a path to eventual statehood.
3. THE INSULAR CASES ARE DECIDED
Two general observations must be made about the Insular Cases
themselves, De Lima, Goetz, Armstrong, Downes, and Huus. First,
they all arose from controversies involving commercial operations
with the new territories, although obviously the issues raised
required interpretation of the Constitution. Second, with the
exception of Huus, none of the decisions resulted in unanimous
opinions of the Court; in fact, all were five-to-four outcomes. On
this last point, it is important to consider the composition of the
Court that decided this first round of the Insular Cases.67 Since 1888
its Chief Justice had been Mellville Weston Fuller, a Democrat from
Maine. Although conservative on economic matters, 68 he was
generally opposed to imperialist expansion. He was a member of
the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson, decided in 1896, shortly before
the Spanish-American War.
The Plessy majority opinion was written by Justice Henry
Billings Brown, a Yale graduate from Massachusetts who was
appointed to the Court in 1890, and whose views toward "Spanish-
Americans" were not favorable.69 Justice Rufus Wheeler Peckham,
another Democrat appointed to the Court in 1895, was from New
67 See generally THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969
vols. 2 & 3, at 1471-95, 1281-95, 1379-89, 1515-34, 1553-63, 1577-92, 1633-57,
1685-1703, 1719-36 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969) (providing
biographies of Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Harlan, Gray, Brewer, Brown,
Shiras, White, Peckham, and McKenna).
68 See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding the
federal income tax unconstitutional); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(holding wage and hours laws to be a violation of the Due Process clause).
69 CHARLES A. KENT, MEMOIR OF HENRY BILLINGS BROWN 136 (1915). Shortly
before the Spanish-American War he wrote: "There is but one way in which the
Spanish-American people are united. They all hate us-always have, and always
will, and the more we do for them the more bitter their hatred. I dislike the idea of




York and also was a member of the Plessy majority. Other
members of the Plessy court who also took part in these early
Insular Cases included Justices Joseph McKenna, George Shiras, Jr.,
Edward Douglas White, and Horace Gray.
Justice McKenna, a native of Pennsylvania, previously had
become a political ally of President McKinley during overlapping
tenures in Congress. When McKinley became President, he named
McKenna as the Attorney General of the United States, and shortly
thereafter, appointed him to the Court in 1896. Of McKenna it has
been said that "[h]is mind [was] uncluttered by the complex dicta
of legal scholarship." 70 Justice Shiras, another Yale graduate, was
from Pittsburgh and became a member of the Supreme Court in
1892. A former railroad and mining lawyer, he voted regularly in
favor of these interests.71 Justice White came from a prominent
Louisiana family, and became a senator from that state in 1890.
While in the Senate he became a well-known sugar tariff
protectionist and an active opponent of the annexation of Hawaii
as being against the interests of his sugar producing state. His
loyalty to the sugar trust was such that he refused to be sworn into
the Court in 1894 until after he had voted on the passage of a
pending bill that added a forty percent ad valorem tax on imported
sugar. Justice Gray, another Justice from Massachusetts, attended
Harvard Law School where he was a classmate of Professor
Langdell. In addition to voting with the majority in Plessy, Justice
Gray was a member of the majority in Elk v. Wilkins, 72 which held
that Native Americans were not citizens of the United States.
The two remaining members of the court for these early Insular
Cases, Justices David J. Brewer and John Marshall Harlan, were not
part of the Plessy majority. Justice Brewer, born in Asia Minor to
missionary parents, and another Yale graduate, was appointed to
the Court in 1888. He was an outspoken anti-imperialist, 73 yet
70 James F. Watts, Jr., Joseph McKenna, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, supra note 67, at 1727.
71 See Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 162 U.S. 184 (1896) (voting on behalf of railroad company plaintiff);
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Ala. Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144 (1897) (voting
to restrict the ICC's influence over railroad companies).
72 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
73 See, e.g., David J. Brewer, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, The
Spanish War: A Prophecy or an Exception?, Address at the Third Dinner of the
Liberal Club (Feb. 16, 1899) (on file with the Harvard Law Library) (arguing that
America's becoming a colonial power would be contrary to the ideals of the
Declaration of Independence).
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believed in encouraging the spread of Christian principles.74
Although a member of the Court when Plessy was decided, Justice
Brewer did not participate in the decision.
The last of the Court's members was Justice Harlan, who was
born in Kentucky. A Republican, he was appointed to the Court in
1877. Thereafter he served for thirty-four years during which he
became known as a champion for civil rights, and as such was a
dissenter in Plessy.75
74 See MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE 1837-1910, at 129 (1994) (stating that while Brewer generally opposed
imperialism, his support of missionary activities led him to approve of American
military intervention in China to protect missionaries during the Boxer Rebellion);
David J. Brewer, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Our Duty as Citizens,
Lecture at Haverford College, in DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES: A CHRISTIAN
NATION 69-70 (1905) ("I do not stop to discuss.., whether it is wise wholly to
forget Washington's farewell advice to avoid entangling alliances with other
nations.... But of one thing I am sure. In no other way can this republic become a
world power than by putting into her life and the lives of her citizens the spirit
and principles of the great founder of Christianity."). It should be noted that the
manifest destiny movement was at least partially based on the duty to spread
Christianity, particularly the Protestant versions, to other lands and peoples. See
PRATT, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing Congregational clergyman Josiah Strong's
views of Christian expansion in his work, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its
Present Crisis).
75 See 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. ... The law regards
man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved."); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26-61 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (supporting the
view that by passing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Congress
intended to prevent racial discrimination in private as well as public contexts);
Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58-69 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that states do not have a right to prohibit private integrated educational
institutions); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538-57 (1884) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (contending that to maintain consistency with due process in capital
cases, a state may not convict a person unless a grand jury has presented an
indictment); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114-27 (1908) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment protection of the right to
freedom from self-incrimination does not apply only to federal court cases);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 82-106 (1911) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(objecting to the Court's relaxation of antitrust scrutiny by adopting the "rule of
reason"); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 189-93 (1911) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (same); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 608-53
(1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that public instrumentalities for federal
tax collection are exempt from paying taxes while private corporations are not);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65-74 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that states' general police power enables them to interfere with private contracts
in order to limit workers' hours); see also Alan F. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and
the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J.




Before this judicial lineup all five Insular Cases were argued
from January 8 through 11, 1901, with all of the decisions being
handed down on May 27, 1901. In the first of these cases, De Lima
v. Bidwell,76 an importer of goods from Puerto Rico sought to
recover duties paid on goods brought into the port of New York
from Puerto Rico in September 1899. As the collector of customs in
that port, Mr. Bidwell was of the view that Puerto Rico was a
"foreign country" within the meaning of the tariff laws and thus
taxed the goods accordingly.
A majority of five justices, including Chief Justice Fuller, and
Justices Brown, Peckham, Harlan, and Wheeler thought otherwise,
stating that upon ratification of the Treaty of Paris, Puerto Rico
"became territory of the United States -although not an organized
territory in the technical sense of the word." 77 Perhaps more
surprising, when considered in retrospect, is the language that
followed:
The theory that a country remains foreign with respect to
the tariff laws until Congress has acted by embracing it
within the Customs Union, presupposes that a country may
be domestic for one purpose and foreign for another ....
[B]ut no act is necessary to make it domestic territory ...
once it has been ceded to the United States.... This theory
also presupposes that territory may be held indefinitely by
the United States; that it may be treated in every particular,
except for tariff purposes, as domestic territory; that laws
may be enacted and enforced by officers of the United
States sent there for that purpose.., that everything may
be done which a government can do within its own
boundaries, and yet that the territory may still remain a
foreign country. That this state of things may continue for
years, for a century even, but that until Congress enacts
otherwise, it still remains a foreign country. To hold that this
can be done as a matter of law we deem to be pure judicial
legislation. We find no warrant for it in the Constitution or in
the powers conferred upon this court.
78
flowed from a desire to protect citizens from government oppression).
76 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
77 Id. at 196.
78 Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
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As we shall see, this was not a majority that would hold firm.
Several of its members would switch before the day was over and
engage in their own brand of "judicial legislation," or "judicial
activism," as it is now called.
The route eventually taken was forecast by the dissent in De
Lima, in which Justice McKenna expounded, for the first time in
American constitutional jurisprudence, Lowell's Third View theory
of incorporation. McKenna proposed that because "the treaty with
Spain, instead of providing for incorporating the ceded territory
into the United States, as did the treaty with Mexico, expressly
declares that the status of the ceded territory is to be determined by
Congress," 79 the same criteria for determining the application of
U.S. laws did not apply as in the case of the territories acquired
from Mexico. In Justice McKenna's opinion, based on his own
construction of both the powers of the government and of the
treaty with Spain, "the danger of the nationalization of savage
tribes cannot arise."8 0 From this minority view in De Lima we see
the emergence of what will become the eventual doctrine of the
Insular Cases, encompassing the three key components of American
colonial law: (1) plenary congressional authority over the Spanish
island territories and their inhabitants, (2) a distinction between
these territories and all other prior acquisitions, based on a newly
discovered theory of incorporation, and (3) rules to deal with the
"Philippine problem," which once established would continue to
be the decisive criteria for the consideration of the issues arising
from all the territories, even after the Philippine problem had
passed.
Goetze v. United States,8' joined for procedural reasons with
Crossman v. United States, followed De Lima. They too concerned
tariff impositions, with Goetze involving goods from Puerto Rico
and Crossman involving products from Hawaii; thus, the Court
summarily decided them in accordance with De Lima. As we shall
see, decisions involving Hawaii and Puerto Rico thereafter would
proceed along different paths, at least in the eyes of the Supreme
Court and the political cabals of the nation, with Hawaii directed
79 Id. at 214. See Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and
the Kingdom of Spain, supra note 21, art. IX, para. 2 ("The civil rights and political
status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States
shall be determined by the Congress.").
80 De Lima, 182 U.S. at 219.




toward statehood and Puerto Rico toward its present status of
political limbo.
Dooley v. United States82 was factually the reverse of these prior
cases in that it involved goods imported into Puerto Rico from the
mainland United States during the three judicially-distinct pre-
Foraker Act periods that existed prior to the enactment of this
statute: (1) the period from July 26, 1898 to August 19, 1898, when
U.S. troops were in Puerto Rico and the United States and Spain
were still at war, during which time a military order issued by
General Nelson Miles, the commander of the U.S. forces in Puerto
Rico, directed that former Spanish and Puerto Rican taxes be
exacted; (2) the period from August 19, 1898 to February 1, 1899,
during which a customs tariff for goods entering Puerto Rico was
established by presidential proclamation; and (3) the period from
February 1, 1899 to May 1, 1900, during which the Foraker Act was
in effect. As in the earlier cases, the opinion in Dooley was divided
five-to-four, with Justice Brown again writing for the majority and
with the same dissenters, led this time by Justice White.8 3 The
majority identified April 11, 1899, the date of ratification of the
Treaty of Paris, as the date on which Puerto Rico ceased being part
of Spain.84 Prior thereto, goods were subject to being taxed as
before that date; thereafter Puerto Rico was within the U.S.
customs union.85 As it involved the same question as Dooley,
Armstrong v. United States86 was summarily decided following the
same reasoning.
With the issuance of Downes v. Bidwell, however, the views of
the Court became more complicated. In what would prove to be
the central case in establishing Puerto Rico's status within the
American polity, as well as that in all other areas acquired
contemporaneously or thereafter, no majority opinion was
delivered;8 7  instead, the various opinions constituted a
kaleidoscope of views regarding the status of the new territories.
With Justice Brown delivering an opinion upholding the Foraker
Act, Justice White writing a concurrence joined by Justices Shiras
and Gray, and Justice McKenna reaching the same result in a
82 182 U.S. 222 (1901).
83 Id. at 236 (White, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 234.
85 Id.
86 182 U.S. 243 (1901).
87 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 244 n.1 (1901).
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separate opinion of his own, a majority of five votes upheld the
validity of the Foraker Act against a challenge that it violated the
Uniformity Clause. Meanwhile, a dissent by Chief Justice Fuller
was joined by Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham. Thus, by a
five-to-four plurality, in which a dissenting opinion garnered the
most votes, and against all precedent, the Supreme Court
sanctioned a colonial regime that has existed for over one hundred
years to the present day, and as to which there is no legal or
political alternative yet in sight.
Justice Brown saw the issue presented as one involving not
only the issue of whether the Foraker Act ran contrary to the
Uniformity Clause of the Constitution, but also one which
concerned "the broader question whether the revenue clauses of
the Constitution extend of their own force to our newly acquired
territories."8 8 In what must be considered a strict constructionist's
worst nightmare, Brown concluded that the answer was to be
found, not in the Constitution itself but rather "in the nature of the
government created by that instrument, in the opinion of its
contemporaries, in the practical construction put upon it by
Congress and in the decisions of this court."89 Clearly, he was
leaving himself ample room to wiggle. Furthermore, in its
discussion of both Chief Justice Marshall's alleged dicta in
Loughborough, and in its similar treatment of Chief Justice Taney's
views in Dred Scott, Brown's opinion undoubtedly reflects the
influence of Professor Langdell's "theory of attachment." 90
In a contemporaneous article in the Harvard Law Review,
Charles E. Littlefield severely criticized Justice Brown's views:
Mr. Justice Brown says these are "certain observations [in
Loughborogh] which have occasioned some embarrassment
in other cases," but I submit in none so great as the Downes
case. The extraordinary ingenuity manifested in this case
88 Id. at 249.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 292-93, 361 (agreeing with Marshall's statement in Loughborough
that Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution grants the federal government power
to tax the District of Columbia and disputing Justice Taney's assertion in Dred
Scott that the Territorial Clause was not meant to enable the federal government
to establish political power over territories); cf. Langdell, supra note 30, at 382-83
(arguing that because the District of Columbia was created from states, where the
Constitution had already attached, it may be difficult to demonstrate that the




by the earnest effort to escape from that authority
constitutes one of its most striking features.... Mr. Justice
Brown is entitled to the credit of introducing in an opinion
for the first time a new method of disposing of that case. I
do not say he discovered it, for it is true that there were
statesmen who, in groping about for a way to escape from
Marshall's logic, had blazed out this path. He admits that
the conclusion [in Loughborough] is correct, "so far at least as
it applies to the District of Columbia." He cannot quite get
up to denying the case in toto.91
Justice Brown's opinion evidences the racism and Filipino-
phobia of the times when he stated:
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant
possessions grave questions will arise from differences of
race, habits, laws and customs of the people, and from
differences of soil, climate and production, which may
require action on the part of Congress that would be quite
unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous territory
inhabited only by people of the same race, or by scattered
bodies of native Indians.92
His parting shot is an oft-quoted passage that shows his
unequivocal support for the expansionist forces of the times:
A false step at this time might be fatal to the development
of what Chief Justice Marshall called the American
Empire.... If [distant] possessions are inhabited by alien
races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods
of taxation and modes of thought, the administration of
government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon
principles, may for a time be impossible; and the question at
once arises whether large concessions ought not to be made
for a time, that, ultimately, our own theories may be carried
out, and the blessings of a free government under the
Constitution extended to them. We decline to hold that
there is anything in the Constitution to forbid such action.
91 Charles E. Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 HARV. L. REV. 169, 178 (1901).
92 Downes, 182 U.S. at 282.
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We are therefore of opinion that the Island of Porto Rico
is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United
States, but not a part of the United States within the
revenue clauses of the Constitution [and] that the Foraker
Act is constitutional... . 93
One cannot but surmise what was visualized by Justice Brown
when he indicated that these were rules for governing these
territories "for a time," considering that they are still in effect 106
years after they were established. 94
The opinion in Downes by Justice White, joined by Justices
Shiras and McKenna, proposed what was to be dubbed the
"incorporation doctrine," and would eventually prevail as the rule
of the Insular Cases. As previously noted, it was a theory first
espoused by Lowell in his Third View article.95 In Justice White's
opinion, whether a particular constitutional provision applied in a
territory was determined by the kind of territory involved, a
determination that was itself established by the treaty of
acquisition.
[Wihere a treaty contains no conditions for incorporation,
and, above all, where it not only has no such conditions but
expressly provides to the contrary, incorporation does not
arise until in the wisdom of Congress it is deemed that the
acquired territory has reached that state where it is proper
that it should enter into and form a part of the American
family.96
Because Puerto Rico was an "unincorporated territory,"
Congress was limited only by "restrictions... so fundamental [in]
nature that they cannot be transgressed, although not expressed in
so many words in the Constitution." 97 With regard to this case,
however:
93 Id. at 286-87(emphasis added).
94 Cf. Igartfia-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (holding that residents of Puerto Rico do not have a constitutional right to
vote in U.S. presidential elections, consistent with Downes, which held that the
revenue clause of the U.S. Constitution does not extend to Puerto Rico).
95 See Lowell, supra note 30, at 176 (introducing the incorporation doctrine).
96 Downes, 182 U.S. at 339 (White, J., concurring).




The result of what has been said is that whilst in an
international sense Porto Rico was not a foreign country,
since it was subject to the sovereignty of and was owned by
the United States, it was foreign to the United States in a
domestic sense, because the island has not been incorporated
into the United States, but was merely appurtenant thereto as
a possession.... [I]n other words, the provision of the
Constitution just referred to [i.e., the Uniformity Clause]
was not applicable to Congress in legislating [the Foraker
Act] for Porto Rico.98
Chief Justice Fuller's dissent, joined by Justices Harlan, Brewer,
and Peckham, followed a strict construction of the Constitution as
well as the precedent established by Chief Justice Marshall in
Loughborough that the uniformity required by Article I, Section 8 in
legislating taxes was geographical uniformity "[throughout all the]
States and territories." 99 Fuller further disputed the assertion that
the Treaty of Paris could contravene what was established in the
Constitution, arguing that no treaty could enlarge the powers of
Congress in contravention of the Constitution:
[T]he contention seems to be that if an organized and
settled province of another sovereignty is acquired by the
United States, Congress has the power to keep it, like a
disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous
existence for an indefinite period; and, more than that, that
after it has been called from that limbo, commerce with it is
absolutely subject to the will of Congress, irrespective of
constitutional provisions.
Great stress is thrown upon the word 'incorporation,' as
if possessed of some occult meaning, but I take it that the
act under consideration made Porto Rico, whatever its
situation before, an organized territory of the United
States....
98 Id. at 341-42 (emphasis added).
99 Id. at 353 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
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The concurring opinion ... assumes that Congress is not
bound, in those territories or possessions, to follow the
rules of taxation prescribed by the Constitution....
That theory assumes that the Constitution created a
government empowered to acquire countries throughout
the world, to be governed by different rules than those
obtaining in the original States and territories, and
substitutes for the present system of republican
government, a system of domination over distant provinces
in the exercise of unrestricted power.100
In Chief Justice Fuller's view, such unrestricted power was
negated by "the language of the Constitution [which] is too plain
and unambiguous to permit its meaning to be thus influenced." 1 1
To thus "distort" may more accurately characterize what the
Downes majority did to the Constitution.
Justice Harlan's separate dissent is of singular importance
because he focuses on the principal flaw of the doctrine established
by the Insular Cases: their failure to give due weight to the fact that
the Constitution "speaks... to all peoples, whether of States or
territories, who are subject to the authority of the United States."
102
This emphasis on people, rather than on other points of reference,
such as geography, procedures, or legislation, is a typical Harlan
approach, reflecting his concern for the civil liberties of the
individual. It is in contrast to the dogma of the Insular Cases, by
which the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens are determined by
the status of the land on which the citizens are located, 103 rather
than by their status as citizens. As will be seen, this is a rule which
100 Id. at 372-73.
101 Id. at 374.
102 Id. at 378 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
103 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (holding that the
constitutional guarantee of a jury trial does not apply to territories of the United
States that have not been incorporated into the Union); see also Califano v. Torres,
435 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding that a provision of the Social Security Act which limits
benefits to United States residents is constitutional); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651 (1980) (holding that Puerto Rico can be treated differently than the states by
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program so long as there is a




the Supreme Court would apply in a clearly discriminatory
fashion.1 04
In his dissent Harlan vehemently chastises the views of the
majority as promoting "a radical and mischievous change in our
system of government." 105 Specifically, he points out that the
holding is contrary to long established principles that the branches
of government are authorized to exercise only enumerated powers,
and thus do not possess any powers outside of the Constitution:
Still less is it true that Congress can deal with new
territories just as other nations have done or may do with
their new territories.... Monarchical and despotic
governments, unrestrained by written constitutions, may
do with newly acquired territories what this Government
may not do consistently with our fundamental law. To say
otherwise is to concede that Congress may, by action taken
outside of the Constitution, engraft upon our republican
institutions a colonial system such as exists under
monarchical governments. Surely such a result was never
contemplated by the fathers of the Constitution.... The
idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere
upon the earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them as
mere colonies or provinces -the people inhabiting them to
enjoy only such rights as Congress chooses to accord to
them-is wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius as
well as with the words of the Constitution.
10 6
These are words whose worth transcends the subject of the
Insular Cases and that period in our history.
The last decision in this first round of cases, Huus v. New York &
Porto Rico Steamship Co., 10 7 was an oddly unanimous 108 holding in
104 Compare Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309 ("It is locality that is determinative of the
application of the Constitution... not the [citizenship] status of the people who
live in it."), with Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) ("[W]e reject the idea that
when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of
Rights.").
105 Downes, 182 U.S. at 379.
106 Id. at 380.
107 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
108 Another unanimous Insular Cases-related decision was Gonzalez v.
Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904), in which the Court, with the judicial inventiveness that
typified the whole Insular Cases era, ruled that the inhabitants of Puerto Rico
became U. S. nationals after the Treaty of Paris was signed, owing allegiance to the
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which the issue was whether the vessel Ponce, engaged in trade
between Puerto Rico and the United States, had to pay pilotage
fees upon entering the port of New York. Pilotage fees were only
required of vessels engaged in foreign trade. The Court thus ruled
that the Ponce need not pay pilotage fees because Puerto Rico was
not foreign territory but "properly a part of the domestic trade of
the [United States] since the treaty of annexation...."109
In the long run the Huus decision would have important
economic consequences not only for Puerto Rico but also for all
noncontiguous U.S. lands, including Hawaii and Alaska, in that it
essentially required the application of the cabotage laws of the
United States to all marine transportation between those U.S. areas
and the U.S. mainland (or even between the U.S. mainland ports).
Thus, only U.S. flag carriers could engage in this "coastwise" trade,
driving the cost of this interstate commerce high in comparison to
foreign commerce.
4. THE PROGENY OF THE INSULAR CASES
4.1. The Further Application of the Incorporation Theory
As is evident from the history above, the Insular Cases left the
constitutional law to be applied in the newly created
"unincorporated territories" in an uncertain nebula. This
uncertainty was soon dispelled as the composition of the Court
changed and a clear majority was consolidated that favored the
incorporation doctrine promoted by the Downes plurality. The
catalysts that allowed for this consolidation were the respective
replacements of Justice Gray by Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1902,
and Justice Shiras by William R. Day in 1903.
Justice Holmes, who was born in Boston, attended Harvard
College before fighting as an officer in the Union Army in the Civil
War, during which he was wounded on three occasions.
United States notwithstanding their not being citizens thereof. As nationals they
could enter the United States without impediment, as they were not aliens. Dick
Thornburgh commenting on this decision states that in engaging in this judicial
legislation the Supreme Court created a "limbo status for... noncitizens in [the]
newly acquired overseas territories... demonstrat[ing] that once the courts start
making political and social policy, they often have to make yet more political and
social policy to sustain those court-created policies that are not sustained by
measures adopted by the political branches of government." DICK THORNBURGH,
PUERTO Rico's FUTURE: A TIME TO DECIDE 49 (2007).




Thereafter he attended Harvard Law School and eventually sat for
almost twenty years on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts before his appointment to the Supreme Court of the
United States, where he served for twenty-nine years. He would
be a recurrent dissenter on a patently conservative Court.110 In his
famous essay, The Common Law, written before his appointment to
the Supreme Court, he said:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have a good deal more to do
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed."'
These are observations well worth keeping in mind when
considering the subject at hand and in explaining how he voted in
Insular Cases matters.
Justice Day, an Ohio native, attended the University of
Michigan Law School, where he became associated with another
young lawyer by the name of William McKinley. In 1897, Day was
appointed First Assistant Secretary of State by then-President
McKinley, and soon became the de facto Secretary, a role which led
to his presiding over the negotiations that culminated in the
signing of the Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American
War. He later served on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
was presided over by William Howard Taft, the future President
and later Chief Justice of the United States when the seminal
Insular-related case of Balzac v. Porto Rico"12 was decided. Day was
appointed to the Supreme Court by Theodore Roosevelt, a kindred
Spanish-American War spirit who had become President after
McKinley was assassinated in 1901.
110 See FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 77-87
(2d ed. 1961) (discussing Holmes' unwavering belief in freedom of speech in the
post-World War I era while the majority of the court frequently upheld
administrative restrictions thereon but disallowed restraints on economic power).
111 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Lecture I: Early Forms of Liablity, in THE COMMON
LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
112 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
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The first Insular-related case in which the two new Justices
participated was Hawaii v. Mankichi.113 Mankichi was accused of
and tried for murder after the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands
by the United States pursuant to the Newlands Resolution of July
7, 1898, but prior to the enactment of the Hawaiian Organic Act,
which provided that Hawaiian law would continue in effect if not
"inconsistent with the Constitution." 114 Mankichi, who was found
guilty by a nine-to-three vote of a petit jury, claimed that his
conviction violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments
because he had neither been indicted by a grand jury nor convicted
unanimously by a petit jury. With Justice White writing a five-
judge majority that included the two new Justices, the Supreme
Court rejected Mankichi's claims. The Court concluded that
Hawaii was not incorporated into the United States until 1900,115
when U.S. citizenship was granted to its inhabitants. Because
Mankichi's charge and trial preceded that date, the Court ruled
that, pursuant to Downes, the Constitution did not provide
Mankichi with the protections to which he claimed to be entitled.
The crucial holding of Mankichi was that it was the granting of
citizenship that was the determinative factor in deciding whether a
territory had been incorporated into the United States. This
criterion not only made logical sense, but was in keeping with our
national history as demonstrated by the practice that had been
uninterruptedly followed since the days of the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 upon the acquisition of new territories.
116
A somewhat embarrassing point is raised by Chief Justice
Fuller in his dissent, in which he argues that Mankichi is correct in
his constitutional arguments because in fact Hawaii had been
incorporated into the United States by reason of the language in
the preamble to the treaty of annexation, one which was actually
forwarded for ratification by the then-Secretary of State, now
Justice Day, and which stated that "those islands should be
incorporated into the United States as an integral part thereof and
under its sovereignty." 117
113 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
114 Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, § 6, 31 Stat. 141, 142 (1900).
115 Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 215-18.
116 See JUAN R. TORRUELLA, GLOBAL INTRIGUES 27-35 (2007) (analyzing the
strong expansionist agenda of the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth
century that resulted in increased U.S. citizenship).




Justice Harlan wrote a dissent in Mankichi that was more in
keeping with the fundamental issues raised by the theory of
incorporation. He not only agreed with the Chief Justice's views,
but pointed out further that the majority's holding had the effect
of:
[E]ngraft[ing] upon our republican institutions, controlled
by the supreme law of a written Constitution, a colonial
system entirely foreign to the genius of our Government
and abhorrent to the principles that underlie and pervade
the Constitution. It will then come about that we will have
two governments over the peoples subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, one, existing under a
written Constitution, creating a government with authority
to exercise only powers expressly granted and such as are
necessary and appropriate to carry into effect those so
granted; the other, existing outside of the written
Constitution, in virtue of an unwritten law to be declared
from time to time by Congress, which is itself only a
creature of that instrument. 1 8
Although these are irrefutable arguments, they have remained
unattended.
Nevertheless, the majority's views in Mankichi, regarding the
granting of citizenship to the residents of acquired territories as
being indicative of incorporation of the territory into the United
States, were reinforced in 1905 by Rassmussen v. United States." 9
That case arose out of a misdemeanor conviction in Alaska by a
jury composed of six persons pursuant to a federal statute allowing
such a procedure in Alaska. In a decision written by Justice White,
a majority of the Justices concluded that Alaska had been
incorporated into the United States because the treaty of cession
with Russia specifically declared that "[t]he inhabitants of the
ceded territory shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights,
118 Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 240 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119 See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 516 (1905) ("The treaty with
Russia concerning Alaska, instead of exhibiting, as did the treaty with Spain
regarding the Philippine Islands, the determination to reserve the question of the
status of the acquired territory for ulterior action by Congress, manifested a
contrary intention to admit the inhabitants of the ceded territory to the enjoyment
of citizenship, and expressed the purpose to incorporate the territory into the
United States.").
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advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States."120 The
Constitution thus attached, and the conviction was set aside.
Rasssmussen reaffirmed Makichi not only as to the validity of the
incorporation theory, but also, and more important as regards a
central theme of this Article, as to what was the determining
criterion for concluding whether a territory had been incorporated
into the United States. Although Justices Harlan and Brown
concurred in the outcome, Harlan continued to insist that the
Constitution applied ex propio vigore to all territories whether
incorporated or not.
In the context of these endorsements of the incorporation
doctrine there arose a case from the other side of the American
Empire, the Philippine Islands, at a time when the Philippine
insurrection, a prolongation there of the Spanish-American War,
was still at its height. That case was Kepner v. United States,121 in
which the question presented was whether the double jeopardy
prohibition in the U.S. Constitution applied in the Philippines.
Obviously, there was not much interest on the part of the U.S.
government in extending the Constitution to this territory,
considering the hostile conditions that prevailed at that time.
Justice Day, writing for the majority, avoided the issue altogether
by ruling that the Philippine Organic Act' 22 was sufficient to
prohibit that practice.123
But the question of the applicability of the Constitution to the
Philippines could not be avoided indefinitely. Two years later the
matter was squarely presented before the Court in Dorr v. United
States,124 in which a criminal defendant claimed the right to trial by
jury. The results were predictable. Justice Day, writing for the
majority, concluded that pursuant to Downes, the Constitution did
not apply to the Philippines, which was deemed an unincorporated
territory. Clearly as an occupying power in the Philippines at a
time shortly after the conclusion of a serious armed insurrection,
the United States was concerned about having to hold jury trials
with juries picked from a population presumed to be at least
partially hostile. But as Justice Harlan pointed out in his cogent
120 Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
121 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
122 Philippine Organic Act, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691 (1902).
123 Kepner, 195 U.S. at 134.




dissent, this was an outcome that could prove to have unintended
consequences:
There are many thousands of American soldiers in the
Philippines .... They carry the flag of the United States,
and have not lost their American citizenship. Yet, if
charged in the Philippines with having committed a crime
against the United States of which a civil tribunal may take
cognizance, they cannot, under the present decision, claim
of right a trial by jury.125
As we shall see, the Supreme Court would work its way
around this perceived problem by its double-standard application
of the Insular Cases doctrine in the Second World War cases of
Kinsella v. Krueger126 and Reid v. Covert.
127
4.2. The Extension of the Incorporation Doctrine: Balzac v. Porto
Rico
4.2.1. The Jones Act and the Granting of U.S. Citizenship to
Puerto Ricans
After Kepner, the Court changed composition several times, 128
and several other cases, spawned by the Insular Cases were
decided. 129 However, the most significant event related to the
125 Id. at 156 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
126 351 U.S. 470 (1956), rev'd on reh'g sub nom. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
127 351 U.S. 487 (1956), rev'd on reh'g, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
128 William Henry Moody replaced Justice Henry Billings Brown in 1906;
Justice Rufus Wheeler Peckham died in 1909 and was substituted by Horace
Harmon Lurton; Justice David Brewer died the following year and Charles Evans
Hughes was appointed in his place; Chief Justice Fuller also died in 1910, and
Justice White was elevated to Chief Justice by President Taft; meanwhile Justice
Moody resigned, to be replaced by Joseph Rucker Lamar and Willis Van Devanter
was appointed to fill White's position as Associate Justice, and in 1911, Justice
Harlan, the last remaining opponent of the inequality promoted by the Insular
Cases, died to be replaced by Mahlon Pitney. In 1914 Justice Lurton died, and
James Clark McReynolds was appointed to the Court by President Woodrow
Wilson. See generally HALL, supra note 64, at 105, 371, 419-22, 478, 569, 597, 649,
725, 736, 1045, 1086; 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-
1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1633-57, 1685-1703, 1801-22, 1847-63,
1893-1915, 1945-53, 1973-89, 2001-09, 2023-33 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel
eds., 1969).
129 See Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S.91 (1914) (holding that the
Philippine Bill of Rights "contains no specific requirement such as is contained in
the Fifth Amendment of a presentment or indictment by grand jury, nor is such a
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Insular Cases was the passage of the Jones Act by Congress in
1917,130 the most important provision of which was the granting of
U.S. citizenship to the residents of Puerto Rico.
Starting in 1901, shortly after the enactment of the Foraker Act,
and through 1917, a total of twenty-one bills had been filed in
Congress proposing the granting of citizenship to the residents of
Puerto Rico.131 These efforts received varied degrees of enthusiasm
from the various intervening administrations. For example, in his
1905 message to Congress, President Theodore Roosevelt described
his wish to "earnestly advocate the adoption of legislation which
will explicitly confer American citizenship on all citizens of Porto
Rico. There is, in my judgment, no excuse for failure to do this."132
Somewhat less supportive, the Taft administration also endorsed
several citizenship proposals, 133 with the reservation, however, that
the proposal be "entirely disassociated from any thought of
statehood." 134 This political position of President Taft is worth
keeping in mind in considering his judicial position years later,
when as Chief Justice he wrote Balzac v. Porto Rico, interpreting the
Jones Act, and determined the constitutional rights that attached to
Puerto Ricans by virtue of their gaining that citizenship.
Nevertheless, after Taft and his party were swept from office
by the Democrats in the elections of 1912, the new President,
Woodrow Wilson, in his message to Congress endorsed "giving
[Puerto Ricans] the ample and familiar rights and privileges
accorded our own citizens in our territories," 135 that is, the same
requirement included within the guaranty of due process of law"); Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911) (holding that "[t]he 'face to face' provision of the
Philippine Bill of Rights does not prevent the judge and clerk of the trial court
from certifying as additional record to the appellate court what transpired on the
trial of one convicted of a crime without the accused being present when the order
was made"); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907) (holding that a person
acquitted of a crime committed in the Philippines by a military court of the United
States "cannot subsequently be tried for the same offense in a civil court in that
territory"); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905) (holding that the Supreme
Court of the Philippines did not commit an error in convicting a defendant on
appeal for a crime for which he was acquitted at trial).
130 Jones Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
131 See TORRUELLA, supra note 9, at 85 n.287 (providing citations for these
proposed bills).
132 40 CONG. REC. 23, 36 (1905).
133 E.g., H.R. 22554, 61st Cong., 45 CONG. REC. 2932 (1910).
134 H.R. REP. No. 62-341, at 2 (1912).




U.S. citizenship as was accorded to those in Hawaii and Alaska,
without any mention being made of the restrictions previously
insisted upon by Taft. In all probability these were not totally
altruistic proposals, considering the other interests of the United
States in the region,136 and the fact that the winds of the Great War
were already blowing on our shores.1 37
In any event, on March 2, 1917, with almost no debate on the
floor of Congress regarding the granting of citizenship to Puerto
Ricans,138 President Wilson signed the Jones Act into law. In
addition to the citizenship provision, the statute contained a bill of
rights similar to that in the U.S. Constitution. 139 Also included
were revisions to the structure of the civil government originally
established under the Foraker Act. Although the offices of
governor, attorney general, commissioner of education, and
territorial supreme court justices continued to be appointed by the
136 Adroitly verbalized by Congressman Cooper during the Jones Act debate:
"We are never to give up Porto Rico for, now that we have completed the Panama
Canal, the retention of the island becomes very important to the safety of the
canal, and in that way to the safety of the Nation itself. It helps to make the Gulf
of Mexico an American lake." 54 CONG. REc. 4170 (1917); see also JORGE RODRfGUEZ
BERUFF, STRATEGY AS POLITICS: PUERTO Rico ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
28 (2007) (noting military presence in Puerto Rico and the twin American aims of
securing the Panama Canal and ensuring national security by guarding the Gulf
of Mexico).
137 Compare RODRiGUEZ BERUFF, supra note 136, at 31-32 (discussing Puerto
Rico's enhanced strategic importance during World War I because of its
"perceived naval importance in the Caribbean" and potential "as a source for
military recruits," on President Wilson's decision to sign the Jones Act), ARTURO
MORALES CARRION, PUERTO Rico: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 193 (1983)
("More was involved than the relations between the United States and Puerto
Rico or the vagaries of colonial tutelage. Much of the world was at war, and
defense considerations now impinged on many decisions of the
Administration."), and EFRtN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO
RICO 147 (2001) (exploring why the United States granted citizenship to Puerto
Ricans and concluding that "certainly wider strategic preoccupations figured
principally among the considerations borne in mind by American decision
makers."), with Jos6 A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 391, 406 (1978) ("The author is unaware of any evidence of a design by
anyone in the American government during this period to make extensive use of
Puerto Ricans in the armed services or to make Puerto Ricans citizens on the
theory that they might then be conscripted.").
138 See 53 CONG REC. 1753, 4021-22, 7281-82, 7468-94, 8409-25, 8457-79 (1916);
54 CONG REC. 1324-29, 2162-64, 2221-23, 2248-65, 3005-11, 3069-74, 3467-79,
3666-67 (1917) (chronicling the debates over the Jones Act and containing little
meaningful discussion about granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans).
139 Jones Act, ch. 145, § 2, 39 Stat. 951, 951-52 (1917).
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President, subject to Senate confirmation, the statute established a
bicameral legislature which was thereafter to be elected by popular
suffrage. 140 A non-voting member of Congress, referred to, as in
the Foraker Act, by the title of "Resident Commissioner," was to be
elected to a four-year term.141 Also provided for was an Article I
federal district court, with "jurisdiction of all cases cognizable in
the district courts of the United States." 142 All "statutory laws of
the United States not locally inapplicable... [would] have the
same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the United States, except
the internal revenue laws ... " 143
4.2.2. Chief Justice Taft Enters the Scene
At about the same time that Congress was considering the
Jones Act for Puerto Rico,144 the composition of the Supreme Court
changed once again during the years leading up to the pivotal case
of Balzac v. Porto Rico. Taking the place of Justice Lamar was John
M. Clarke, a progressive liberal who had opposed imperialism and
140 Id. § 25, 39 Stat. at 958.
141 Id. § 29, 39 Stat. at 959.
142 Id. § 41, 39 Stat. at 965.
143 Id. § 9, 39 Stat. at 955.
144 Two other events in America's colonial empire were also taking place in
1917. The first is that the Philippine Jones Act was enacted into law declaring the
intention of the United States to grant independence to this territory. See An Act
to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the Future Political
Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous
Government for Those Islands, ch. 416, pmbl., 39 Stat. 545 (1917) (seeking to
achieve the "speedy" independence of the Philippine Islands). This is significant
in that it clearly signaled that in Congress's eyes Puerto Rico and the Philippines
were taking different routes towards their destiny. Independence was thus
proclaimed for the Philippines in 1946, after the Japanese occupation of the
Islands during World War II. See Proclamation No. 2695, 3 C.F.R. 64 (1946 Supp.),
60 Stat. 1352 (declaring the independence of the Philippine Islands); 22 U.S.C. §
1394 (2000) (affirming the same). Puerto Rico is, of course, still in the fold with a
modicum of additional local self-government having been granted by Congress in
1950. See An Act to Provide for the Organization of a Constitutional Government
by the People of Puerto Rico, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (1950); see also Juan R. Torruella,
iHacia d6nde vas Puerto Rico?, 107 YALE L.J. 1503, 1511-12 (1998) (reviewing Jose
TRIAS MONGE, PUERTO RIco: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD
(1997)) (discussing the enactment of the Jones Act).
The second event was the acquisition of the Danish Virgin Islands by the
United States. See Convention Between the United States and Denmark for
Cession of the Danish West Indies, U.S.-Den., Aug. 4, 1916, 39 Stat. 1706. Thus,
while the United States was planning to reduce its formal empire in the Far East, it
was expanding it closer to home in the Caribbean by purchasing from Denmark




had joined presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan in
demanding independence for the Philippines. Then, in 1916, the
resignation of Justice Hughes occasioned the appointment of Louis
D. Brandeis, a brilliant but controversial selection. Brandeis had
been considered "not fit" by seven former presidents of the
American Bar Association, including soon-to-be Chief Justice
William Howard Taft, with whom Brandeis was at odds
ideologically. 45 Taft would join the Court in 1921 to replace Chief
Justice White, the last survivor of the original Insular Cases lineup
and the principal advocate of the incorporation doctrine.
146
In addition to being a life-long crusader of the status quo and
an active opponent of social democracy, 147 more importantly, Taft
had an extensive background in insular and colonial affairs. In
January 1900, when the Philippine insurgency was at its height,
Taft had resigned as Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit to become the
first civilian governor of the Philippines, a post that he occupied
until 1904. By that time, the Filipino insurgents had been crushed
and Taft had returned to Washington to become the Secretary of
War in Theodore Roosevelt's administration. Nevertheless, he
continued to maintain his involvement in Philippine affairs in that
capacity, in addition to which he also was intimately active in
matters related to the Panama Canal and Puerto Rico. In 1906, he
was sent to Cuba to deal with unrest there under the provisions of
145 Of Justice Brandeis's 528 opinions while on the Court, 84 were dissents,
many of them from Chief Justice Taft's views. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 354 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Taft's decision to
invalidate an Arizona law that protected striking laborers from court injunctions).
146 Two obscure but Insular Cases-related decisions were handed down by the
Supreme Court in 1918 while Chief Justice White still held tenure: Porto Rico v.
Tapia, 245 U.S. 639 (1918) (per curiam) and Porto Rico v. Muratti, 245 U.S. 639
(1918) (per curiam). In both cases, the lower courts in Puerto Rico had concluded
that defendants had not been properly charged because they had not been
indicted by grand juries, and thus, presumably the Sixth Amendment had been
violated. In a cryptic per curiam the Supreme Court reversed, citing Downes,
Mankichi, and Dorr, an inscrutable conclusion at the time considering what the
Court had said regarding the granting of citizenship in Mankichi and Rasmussen,
but understandable with the benefit of the hindsight that Balzac would soon
provide. Id.
147 See, e.g., William H. Taft, The Right of Private Property, 3 MICH. L. J. 215, 218
(1894) (noting that "security of property and contract and liberty are indissolubly
linked" and, as a result, "with [our government's] many checks and balances," we
are better able to protect those intrinsic rights because the United States is "much
further removed from the gusty and unthinking passions of temporary
majorities" than England).
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. In t'l L. [Vol. 29:2
the Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution,148 which
authorized such interventions by the United States whenever its
interests in that island were deemed threatened. In 1909, during
his tenure as President, Taft became disenchanted with Puerto
Ricans generally as a result of a budgetary crisis caused by the
refusal of its popularly elected lower house to approve the annual
budget for the insular government, in protest against various
judicial designations made by the presidentially appointed
governor. Taft took umbrage at the situation and retaliated with
the Olmstead Act,1 49 placing Puerto Rico under the supervision of
the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department.150 Thereafter,
during a message to Congress, President Taft accused Puerto
Rico's elected leaders of irresponsibility and political immaturity,
148 The Platt Amendment respecting Cuba was added to the army
appropriations bill for 1901-02. Act of Mar. 2, 1901, ch. 803, paras. I-VII, 31 Stat.
895, 898 (1901). The Cubans incorporated the amendment into the Cuban
constitution on June 12, 1901, as a condition of American withdrawal from the
island. In it, Cuba agreed not to impair its independence by treaty with foreign
powers, not to assume public debt beyond the ability of its ordinary revenues to
liquidate, to permit U.S. intervention for the protection of Cuban independence,
and to sell or lease to the United States land necessary for naval or coaling
stations. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPCIBLICA DE CUBA art. III (1901).
149 See Truman R. Clark, President Taft and the Puerto Rican Appropriation Crisis
of 1909, 26 THE AMERICAS 152, 153 (1969) ("Taft's strong reaction to the Puerto
Rican appropriation crisis and his subsequent manipulations of some of the
Puerto Rican political leaders show another, perhaps more Rooseveltian, side to
him.").
150 The placing of Puerto Rico under the War Department, although
"represent[ing] a hardening of colonial policy," RODRIGUEZ BERUFF, supra note 136,
at 37, was not in fact a total departure from the manner in which Puerto Rico had
been governed since the change in sovereignty from Spain, and for that matter,
during Spanish sovereignty when Spanish governor generals were the order of
the day. Most of the early U.S. colonial governors were not only military men but
also came from the Indian wars experience in the West. These included all the
military governors from 1898 through 1900: Gen. Nelson A. Miles, Gen. John R.
Brooke, Gen. Guy V. Henry, and Brig. Gen. George Davis. Most of those that
followed as civil governors of Puerto Rico after the Foraker Act of 1900 was
enacted were also in the military or closely affiliated therewith. For instance,
Charles Allen (1900-1904), was a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, as were
Beekman Winthrop (1904-1907), and Theodore Roosevelt Jr. (1929-1932). The
latter, also a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve, died during the invasion of
Normandy in World War II. Other military men who were appointed to the
Puerto Rican governorship included Col. George Colton (1909-1913), Gen.




and stated that too much power had been given to Puerto Ricans
"for their own good."15
1
During his tenure as Chief Justice, Taft was able to exercise
more influence on the proceedings of the Court, and the other
branches of Government, than any other Chief Justice in the
history of the Court, a not unpredictable situation given his
background and the general ethics of the country during the times
when he served. The coincidence of all of these personal
circumstances in the life of Chief Justice Taft would prove
unfortunate for the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico, for the ruling of the
Court in Balzac clearly bears his imprint and his personal biases.
4.2.3. Balzac v. Porto Rico Is Decided
Jesus M. Balzac was the editor of a daily newspaper in Arecibo,
Puerto Rico. He wrote an article indirectly referring to the
governor of Puerto Rico, which was considered libelous by the
local authorities, and as a result of which he was charged with
criminal libel, a misdemeanor under the then-extant Puerto Rican
criminal code. When Balzac requested a jury trial claiming that the
Jones Act entitled him to this procedure pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico denied his request. Balzac was tried on two counts, found
guilty by a judge, and sentenced to five and four months in jail on
the two charges. 5 2
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Balzac's
convictions were affirmed unanimously in an opinion by Chief
Justice Taft based essentially on his views of what was the effect of
the grant of citizenship to Puerto Ricans in the Jones Act:
What additional rights did it give them? It enabled them to
move into the continental United States and becoming
151 William Howard Taft, President, Message to Congress (May 10, 1909), in 3
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 78 (David Burton ed., 2002); see
also 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT (Archon
Books 1964) (1939) (documenting Taft's political career and his statements
advocating less independence for Puerto Rico's government); RODRIGUEZ BERUFF
supra note 136, at 36 (discussing the way in which the "rising labor agitation and
strikes" contributed to Taft's statements about the gravity of the situation and the
subsequent adoption of a provision in the Foraker Act authorizing the "president
to place Puerto Rican affairs under the executive agency of his choosing").
152 People v. Balzac, 28 P.R. 139 (1920); People v. Balzac, 28 P.R. 141 (1920).
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residents of any State there to enjoy every right of any other
citizen of the United States, civil, social and political.
In Porto Rico, however, the Porto Rican can not insist
upon the right of trial by jury .... The citizen of the United
States living in Porto Rico can not there enjoy a right of trial
by jury under the Federal Constitution .... It is locality that
is determinative of the application of the Constitution, in such
matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who
live in it. 15
3
Duplicating Justice Brown's necromantic displays with regard
to inconvenient jurisprudence when confronted by the
Loughborough and Dred Scott decisions in Downes v. Bidwell, Taft
staged a similar performance with regard to Mankichi and
Rassmussen:
It is true that, in the absence of other and countervailing
evidence, a law of Congress or a provision in a treaty
acquiring territory, declaring an intention to confer political
and civil rights on the inhabitants of the new lands as
American citizens, may be properly interpreted to mean an
incorporation of it into the Union, as in the case of
Louisiana and Alaska. This was one of the chief grounds
upon which this court placed its conclusion that Alaska had
been incorporated in the Union, in Rassmussen v. United
States. But Alaska was a very different case from that of
Porto Rico. It was an enormous territory, very sparsely
settled and offering opportunity for immigration and
settlement by American citizens. It was on the American
Continent and within easy reach of the then United States.
It involved none of the difficulties which incorporation of
the Philippines and Porto Rico presents, and one of them is
in the very matter of trial by jury.1 54
Taft then reverts to the pre-Jones Act arguments heard in Dorr
about the Philippines:
The jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise of
the responsibilities of jurors. In common-law countries
153 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1922) (emphasis added).




centuries of tradition have prepared a conception of the
impartial attitude jurors must assume. The jury system
postulates a conscious duty of participation in the
machinery of justice which it is hard for people not brought
up in fundamentally popular government at once to
acquire.... Congress has thought that a people like the
Filipinos or the Porto Ricans, trained to a complete judicial
system which knows no juries, living in compact and
ancient communities, with definitely formed customs and
political conceptions, should be permitted themselves to
determine how far they wish to adopt this institution of
Anglo-Saxon origin, and when.... We can not find any
intention to depart from this policy in making Porto Ricans
American citizens, explained as this is by the desire to put
them as individuals on an exact equality with citizens from
the American homeland, to secure them more certain
protection against the world, and to give them an
opportunity, should they desire, to move into the United
States proper and there without naturalization to enjoy all
political and other rights. 55
Finally, in language that would lead to perpetual ad hoc
litigation in an attempt to define what rights attached to the U.S.
citizens residing in Puerto Rico, Taft states:
The guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights
declared in the Constitution, as for instance that no person
could be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, had from the beginning full application in
the Philippines and Porto Rico, and, as this guaranty is one
of the most fruitful in causing litigation in our own country,
provision was naturally made for similar controversy in
Porto Rico.15 6
Although the glaring inconsistencies and incongruities in the
Balzac decision may be explained away by Taft's biases, it is
difficult to accept how Justices of the caliber of Holmes and
Brandeis would join such a legally faulted opinion without so
much as a word of disagreement. Although the Jones Act had
155 Id. at 310-11.
156 Id. at 312-13.
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made the status of the Philippines and its inhabitants legally and
factually irrelevant, it is clear from Taft's references to the
Philippines that his Filipino-phobia was an important underlying
influence on his conclusions. Apart from these obvious racial
biases, his reliance on those factors is explicable by reference to the
political positions Taft took as President, in which he had objected
to the granting of citizenship to Puerto Ricans if it was linked to
eventual statehood.
Obviously, as was required in light of Rassmussen, Taft was
aware that citizenship was linked with incorporation, and that
incorporation was linked with eventual statehood for the territory;
and Congress was cognizant of this when it granted U.S.
citizenship to Puerto Ricans. The total disregard by Taft of
Rassmussen and Mankichi placed a mantle of legality over an act of
judicial usurpation of legislative intent in granting U.S. citizenship
to the inhabitants. The excuse that was adopted, that Alaska "was
an enormous territory, very sparsely settled and offering
opportunity for immigration and settlement by American citizens"
and "was on the American Continent and within easy reach of the
then United States," 157 is totally lacking in legal and factual content,
and completely ignores or chooses to overlook the
contemporaneous situation with Hawaii, which was similarly
situated with Puerto Rico both geographically and legally after the
Jones Act, and with regard to which the Supreme Court concluded
that the granting of citizenship had brought about incorporation.
Furthermore, Congress's action in legislating the Jones Act after the
Treaty of Paris in effect trumped any inconsistent provisions in
that prior treaty, and thus gave added validity to the holdings in
Mankichi and Rassmussen regarding the consequences of granting
citizenship on the determination of the status of the territory in
question.
In Balzac Taft simply was blinded by his desire to reach a pre-
determined outcome. His assertion that somehow Puerto Ricans
were incapable of understanding "the responsibilities of jurors"
and "popular government" 158 is without any basis in the record or
the facts. Taft conveniently overlooked the fact that civil and
criminal jury trials had been conducted in the U.S. District Court
for Puerto Rico for twenty-three years, since 1899. Additionally,
157 Id. at 309.




for twenty-one years, since 1901, Puerto Rico's own criminal courts
had been conducting jury trials in felony cases pursuant to Puerto
Rico's criminal code,l5 9 imported mostly from California. In
neither jurisdiction had the existence of any inability by the
members of those juries to comprehend their responsibilities been
reported. Furthermore, elective government had been operating in
Puerto Rico since at least the advent of the Foraker Act in 1900,160
without any problems having been claimed other than the 1909
appropriations dispute of the Puerto Rico legislature with then-
President Taft, a dispute that now-Chief Justice Taft obviously had
not forgotten. Without question, by 1922 jury trials and popular
government had been operating vigorously in Puerto Rico for
some time and were an accepted fact of life by its citizens. Last but
not least is the absurdity of the Balzac ruling when one considers
Taft's conclusion that upon moving to the U.S. mainland, Puerto
Ricans ipso facto acquired the full rights of U.S. citizens, including
"the responsibilities of jurors" and participation in "popular
government," yet in that same opinion Taft considered that these
same activities were beyond their comprehension while in Puerto
Rico. One cannot but ponder as to how this magical
transformation was accomplished.
The very fact that the Court would conclude that the right to
trial by jury was not a fundamental constitutional right was in
itself an astonishing conclusion which would not hold water in the
mainland 161 or for mainland U.S. citizens. 162 As is to be expected, it
was a holding for which exceptions and excuses would be found.
159 As the Court itself recognizes. Id. at 300 ("The code of criminal procedure
of Porto Rico grants a jury trial in cases of felony but not in misdemeanors.").
160 It should be noted that during the Spanish regime, elective government
was not totally absent. In fact, Puerto Ricans, who at the time of the change in
sovereignty had the full rights of citizens of Spain, elected sixteen deputies and
three senators to the Spanish parliament (Cortes). See FERNANDO BAYRON TORO,
ELECCIONES Y PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE PUERTO Rico 3 (1977). This is a condition that
has not been duplicated under the American regime. See Igartdia-De La Rosa v.
United States, 417 F.3d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035
(2006) (holding that because Puerto Rico is defined as an unincorporated territory
of the United States, it lacks state status and therefore cannot appoint presidential
electors).
161 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("[T]rial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice ... ").
162 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that it is unconstitutional to
try a civilian entitled to an Article III court by court-martial, which does not afford
the right to a jury trial).
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4.3. The "American Exception": The Discriminatory Application of
the Balzac Doctrine
The holding in Balzac was one for which judicial excuses and
exceptions would be created when an inconvenient scenario arose.
This came about in a predictable setting as a result of World War II
and the overseas trials of dependents of servicemen pursuant to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which permitted the
subjection of those dependents to trial, conviction, and sentencing
by court-martial for certain offenses while they accompanied the
servicemen.
In two such cases, the wives of two servicemen, one in England
(Reid), and one in Japan (Kinsella), murdered their respective
husbands and were subsequently tried, convicted by courts-
martial, and sentenced to prison. They were brought to the United
States to serve their sentences and upon arrival promptly filed
habeas corpus petitions challenging their convictions as having
been carried out in contravention of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments of the Constitution by reason of their lacking both
indictments by grand juries and trials by petit juries. Thus came
Kinsella v. Krueger and Reid v. Covert before the Supreme Court.
Upon their initial appearance before the Court, Justice Tom C.
Clark writing for the majority held that in proceedings outside of
the United States proper, the Insular Cases recognized the power of
Congress to enact a system of laws that did not provide for trial by
jury. Citing specifically to Balzac, the Court concluded in Kinsella
that "[bly 1922 it was regarded as 'clearly settled' that the jury
provisions of Article III and the Sixth and Seventh Amendments
'do not apply to territory belonging to the United States which has
not been incorporated into the Union."' 163 The majority also relied
on In re Ross, a pre-Insular Cases decision upholding the validity of
a trial for murder before a consular court, an Article I tribunal
without a jury, as a valid exercise of congressional power.64
Although Justice Frankfurter reserved judgment on the merits
because of the lack of time left in the term within which to analyze
and decide the issues presented, he filed a separate opinion in
which he noted that In re Ross represented "historically and
juridically, an episode of the dead past about as unrelated to the
163 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 475 (1956) (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at
304-05).




world of today as the one-hoss shay is to the latest jet airplane."165
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Black and
William 0. Douglas dissented 66
After considerable negative public and academic reaction to the
majority opinions in the two cases, the Court decided during the
summer recess to grant rehearings in both cases, and reversals
followed. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Black and
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Brennan, the
latter having just joined the Court in the later part of that summer
after the original opinions were issued. Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan filed separate concurrences.
The opinion of Justice Black brings to mind Justice Harlan's
dissents in the original Insular Cases:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the
Bill of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the
Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source.
It can only act in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution. When the Government
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution
provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped
away just because he happens to be in another land. This is
not a novel concept. To the contrary, it is as old as
government. 167
The opinion continues:
While it has been suggested that only those constitutional
rights which are "fundamental" protect Americans abroad,
we can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking
and choosing among the remarkable collection of "Thou
shalt nots" which were explicitly fastened on all
departments and agencies of the Federal Government by
the Constitution and its Amendments. Moreover, in view
of our heritage and the history of the adoption of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, it seems peculiarly
165 Kinsella, 351 U.S. at 482 (Frankfurter, J., reserving judgment).
166 Id. at 485 (Warren, C.J., Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
167 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
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anomalous to say that trial before a civilian judge and by an
independent jury picked from the common citizenry is not
a fundamental right.
168
As for In re Ross, Justice Black expresses the view that "[a]t best, [it]
should be left as a relic from a different era."
169
Turning to the Insular Cases themselves, Justice Black again
writes as if lifting the language right out of Harlan's dissents in
those cases:
The "Insular Cases" can be distinguished from the
present cases in that they involved the power of Congress
to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily
territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions
whereas here the basis for governmental power is
American citizenship. None of these cases had anything to
do with military trials and they cannot properly be used as
vehicles to support an extension of military jurisdiction to
civilians. Moreover, it is our judgment that neither the cases
nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion. The
concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional
protections against arbitrary government are inoperative
when they become inconvenient or when expediency
dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if
allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written
Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government.
If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the
Government can no longer satisfactorily operate within the
bounds laid down by the Constitution, that instrument can
be amended by the method which it prescribes. But we
have no authority, or inclination, to read exceptions into it
which are not there.170
168 Id. at 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
169 Id. at 12.
170 Id. at 14 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted); cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244, 380 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In my opinion, Congress has no
existence and can exercise no authority outside of the Constitution. Still less is it
true that Congress can deal with new territories just as other nations have done or
may do with their new territories. The nation is under the control of a written
constitution, the supreme law of the land and the only source of the powers which





Although Justice Frankfurter concurred that the court-
martialing of a civilian in peacetime for a capital offense must
comply with Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 171 he
concluded that the fundamental rights test was appropriate for the
territories.172 The newer Justice Harlan, although also concurring
with the majority, essentially agreed with the continued viability of
Ross and the Insular Cases.173  In what was substantially a
restatement of his original majority opinion, Justice Clark
dissented.174
After the second Reid case, other cases that followed
invalidated the use of court-martial procedures to try civilian
spouses accompanying servicemen overseas for non-capital
offenses. 175 Thereafter, the use of such procedures to try civilian
employees accompanying the armed forces overseas, whether on
charges of capital or non-capital offenses, was also declared
unconstitutional.1 76 Unfortunately, however, those who hoped that
these decisions would presage the final demise of the underlying
Insular Cases doctrine were to be repeatedly disappointed, as the
dogma of the Insular Cases has continued to resurface in numerous
and diverse controversies since Reid.
Such cases have included: Examining Board of Engineers,
171 Reid, 354 U.S. at 49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
172 See id. at 53 ("The 'fundamental right' test is the one which the Court has
consistently enunciated in the long series of cases dealing with claims of
constitutional restrictions on the power of Congress to 'make all needful Rules
and Regulations' for governing the unincoporated territories.") (citations
omitted). It should be noted that as a young lawyer, Felix Frankfurter had
worked in the Bureau of Insular Affairs and, while there, on the drafting of the
Jones Bill. MORALES CARRION, supra note 137, at 187.
173 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("But I do not go as far as
[Justice Black] seems to go .... His opinion, if I understand it correctly, in effect
discards Ross and the Insular Cases as historical anomalies. I believe that those
cases, properly understood, still have vitality, and that.., they have an important
bearing on the question now before us."); id. at 74-78.
174 Id. at 79 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("I remain convinced that the former
opinions of the Court are correct and that they set forth valid constitutional
doctrine under the long-recognized cases of this Court.").
175 See, e.g., Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960)
(rejecting court-martial jurisdiction for civilian dependents overseas who are
prosecuted for non-capital offenses).
176 See, e.g., Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (holding that civilian
employees were entitled to the right of trial by jury); McElroy v. United States ex
rel. Guagliardo, 361 U. S. 281 (1960) (holding that Article 2(11) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice did not apply to non-capital offenses committed overseas
by civilian employees).
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Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, in which the Court ruled
that the protections accorded by either the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to residents of Puerto
Rico pursuant to Downes and Balzac;177 Califano v. Torres, in which
pursuant to a definition of "United States" under the Supplemental
Security Income program that excluded Puerto Rico,178 a woman
who qualified for these benefits while a resident of Connecticut
had them withdrawn upon moving to Puerto Rico, with the Court
upholding this discriminatory treatment relying on the doctrine of
the Insular Cases;179 and Harris v. Rosario, a related Social Security
case involving the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program, 180 pursuant to which families with dependent children in
the territories receive less assistance than those residing in the
States.181 Justice Marshall's cogent dissent took issue with Downes
and Balzac as being cases whose "present validity... is
questionable." 18
2
5. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INSULAR CASES
Although discussion of the Insular Cases has covered a span of
over one hundred years, there has been little reference by scholars
or the courts to a topic that, particularly in recent years, deserves
attention. The saga of the Insular Cases has an important symbiotic
international and domestic component that cannot be ignored.
In this respect it is appropriate that we commence with a
177 Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 600 (1976).
178 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(e) (2000).
179 Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 (1978) (per curiam).
180 42 U.S.C. §§ 1308, 1396d(b)(2) (2000).
181 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (holding per curiam that
Puerto Rico could be distinguished from the states because Puerto Rican residents
did not contribute to the federal treasury, the cost of treating Puerto Rico as a state
under the statute would be high, and greater benefits could disrupt the Puerto
Rican economy).
182 Id. at 653-54 (Marshal, J., dissenting) ("It is important to remember at the
outset that Puerto Ricans are United States citizens and that different treatment to
Puerto Rico under AFDC may well affect the benefits paid to these citizens.")
(citation omitted). Similar language was contained in Justice Brennan's
concurrence, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackman, in Torres v.
Puerto Rico, in which the majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger nevertheless
relies on the Insular Cases in holding that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to




reading of a relevant passage in our Constitution, the Supremacy
Clause:
[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges of every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.183
International law has been an integral part of our constitutional
and legal system since the founding of our nation,184 and as the
cited text of the Constitution unequivocally indicates, a treaty, once
entered into, is supreme over all other law.
The Insular Cases have promoted the continued status of the
United States as a colonial nation in a world where that condition
is not only obsolete, but unacceptable as a matter of international
law. By continuing to patronize its continuing colonial
relationships to Puerto Rico, the United States not only degrades its
image as a leader of the democratic world, but also places itself in
clear violation of its international commitments, and thus
concomitantly contravenes its own domestic "Law of the Land."
The United States is a signatory to various treaties, agreements,
and declarations which express international commitments
requiring it to end the colonial status of its several territories, of
which Puerto Rico is its largest and most populous. 185 The United
States is a founding member of the United Nations, whose
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") establishes that
"[e]veryone has the right to take part in the Government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives."18
6
183 U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2 (emphasis added).
184 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (recognizing an
"implicit sanction to entertain the handful of international law cum common law
claims understood in 1789"); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.").
185 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N.GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR]; Organization of American States [OAS], American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, (1948); OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter,
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1 (XXVIII-E/01) (Sept. 11, 2001); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(ratified by United States June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
186 UDHR, supra note 185, art. 21(1).
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Article 21 of the UDHR establishes that "[t]he will of the people
shall be ... expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage." 87 In 1992, the United States
became a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR),188 which provides that "[a]ll peoples have the
right of self-determination," and that "[b]y virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status." 189 Article 25 of the ICCPR
establishes that:
Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity...
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives; [and]
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage .... 190
Additionally pursuant the ICCPR, the United States
"undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,"191 and further
agrees "to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present
Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant." 192
A reading of these provisions should leave little doubt that
with regard to the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico, the United States
does not meet or comply with any of these treaty obligations or
commitments. Although the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico have local
self-government,193 they neither vote for the national offices of
President or Vice President, nor are they represented in Congress
by voting representatives. 94 They, of course, have no say as to the
187 Id. art. 21(3).
188 ICCPR, supra note 185.
189 Id. art. 1(1).
190 Id. art. 25.
191 Id. art. 2(1).
192 Id. art. 2(2).
193 Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (1950).
194 There were plebiscites conducted in 1967, 1993, and 1998, but they were
provided for by the local legislature and thus not binding on Congress. See STAFF




application of federal legislation in or to Puerto Rico.
This unfortunate situation is further aggravated by the fact that
in addition to failing to comply with these treaty obligations, the
government of the United States has actively opposed and
obstructed attempts by the U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico to
correct these violations at such times as they have sought the aid of
the courts. Furthermore, contrary to the unequivocal mandate of
the Supremacy Clause, the courts have been sympathetic to the
U.S. government's opposition to the enforcement of these
treaties,195 notwithstanding that they are the "Law of the Land"
and as such must, under the unequivocal mandate of the
Constitution, be enforced by the courts.
This outcome is principally based on the theory that these
treaties, particularly the ICCPR, are non-self-executing; 196 that is,
that the rights created pursuant to these treaties are allegedly
"precatory" or "aspirational." 197 Thus, according to this reasoning,
the treaties cannot be enforced in the courts of the United States
without enabling municipal legislation making them applicable
domestically. 1
98
5.1. The Doctrine of Self-Execution of U.S. Treaties
The conclusion that the treaties in question, particularly the
PLEBISCITE, SERIAL No. 106-A, at 6 (Comm. Print 1999) (report by Rep. Don Young,
Chairman, House Comm. on Resources & Rep. George Miller, Member, House
Comm. on Resources).
195 See Igartfia-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 149 (1st Cir. 2005)
(en banc), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) ("[N]one of these treaties comprises
domestic law of the United States and so their status furnishes the clearest ground
for denying declaratory relief."); id. at 151 ("[T]he right [to vote] claimed cannot
be implemented by courts unless Puerto Rico becomes a state or until the
Constitution is changed ... ").
196 Courts and commentators have used the term "non-self-executing" to
mean several things. See David N. Cinotti, Note, The New Isolationism: Non-Self-
Execution Declarations and Treaties as the Supreme Law of the Land, 91 GEO. L.J. 1277,
1279-80 (2003) (providing three definitions of "non-self-executing" treaties,
namely, treaties that (a) are nonjusticiable, (b) convey no private right of action, or
(c) require Congress to enact implementing legislation). For present purposes, the
term is defined as treaties which do not create individually enforceable rights
without the passage of implementing legislation. See Columbia Marine Servs.,
Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988) (defining "self-executing" as
prescribing rules for determining private rights).
197 Igarttia-De La Rosa, 417 F.3d at 150.
198 See id. at 150-51 ("[T]hey are not domestic law unless Congress has either
enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be
'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms.").
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ICCPR, are not self-executing is patently flawed.199 As in the case
of the political question doctrine, 200 the doctrine of self-execution-
or put in its negative appellation, the doctrine of non-self-
execution-has at convenient times also been used to sustain
ideological viewpoints. 201 Confusion or obfuscation, purposeful or
otherwise, between the general rule to the effect that treaties do not
create individually enforceable rights, 202 and the specific, well-
established, applicable doctrine of self-execution,2 3 have brought
us to this state of affairs. It is a predicament resulting from the
activism of those who promote the application of the general rule
automatically and presumptively to all treaties, while failing to
take into account the origins of the doctrine of self-execution and
199 See id. at 158-84 (Torruella, J., dissenting); id. at 184-192 (Howard, J.,
dissenting). In my discussion of the issue of self-execution of treaties I have
borrowed heavily from Judge Howard's dissent in this case, which I joined.
200 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 4-5 (1992) ("[T]he 'political-question
doctrine,' is not only not required by[,] but [is] wholly incompatible with
American constitutional theory."); see also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than
Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 334 (2002) ("Because the prudential doctrine allows the
Court to avoid deciding a case without a textual analysis of the Constitution, it is
this aspect of the political question doctrine that seems to be an unjustified
dereliction of the Court's duty to 'say what the law is.'"); Michael J. Glennon,
Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 814, 815 (1989)
("In modem American society, these justifications for judicial abstention [under
the political question doctrine] seem increasingly to be calls for judicial
abdication."); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J.
597, 601 (1976) ("The cases which are supposed to have established the political
question doctrine required no such extra-ordinary abstention from judicial
review; they called only for the ordinary respect by the courts for the political
domain.").
201 See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 760 (1988)
("The distinction found in certain cases between 'self-executing' and 'non-self-
executing' treaties is a judicially invented notion that is patently inconsistent with
the express language in the Constitution .... ); see also LOUiS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 201 (2d ed. 1996) ("A tendency in
the Executive branch and in the courts to interpret treaties and treaty provisions
as non-self-executing runs counter to the language, and spirit, and history of
Article VI of the Constitution."); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing
Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 638 (1986)
(citing the Constitution while noting that the United States follows a system of
"automatic incorporation").
202 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting
disagreement as to whether Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas is self-
executing).
203 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (describing in detail the
proper application of the doctrine of self-execution).
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the history that led to its creation in the first place. 20 4
Although a robust discussion of the legitimacy of the doctrine
of self-execution, its origins, and its applicability is beyond the
scope of this Article, a brief treatment of this topic is required
because it is necessary to demonstrate the speciousness of the
rulings that support this outcome. Suffice it to say as a preliminary
statement, the general rule that a treaty does not create individual
rights without enabling municipal legislation has its roots in
English law.205 Under the English system, treaties are entered into
and concluded by the Crown without any intervention by
Parliament. Because of this, under the English process treaties are
ineffectual domestically, absent implementing legislation by
Parliament.206 Thus, in England there cannot be a self-executing
treaty.
In the United States, as evidenced by the unambiguous
language of the Constitution and the history that led to the
adoption of the relevant constitutional provisions, treaties may be,
and presumably should be, self-executing. The historical record
sustaining this proposition is unquestionable. 2 7 The Framers
204 See generally Carlos Manuel Vszquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995) (discussing the history of the doctrine and the
subtleties of its proper application).
205 See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-80 (10th ed.
1984) (noting that British law has developed independently from customary
international law in that, while the Crown possesses the power to enter treaties,
Parliament must enact enabling legislation because otherwise the Crown would
be able to unilaterally legislate domestic law without Parliament's consent); see
also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 275 (1796) (holding that treaties are
traditionally non-self-executing in England in part because "no man living will
say that a bare proclamation of the King, upon the ground of the treaty" is
adequate authority for enacting domestic law); J.G. Collier, Is International Law
Really Part of the Law of England?, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 924, 925-26 (1989)
(discussing the history of the doctrine of non-self-execution in England and noting
one British court's reasoning that "because a treaty is concluded by the Crown...
and because the Crown cannot... alter the law of the land, the obligation does
not form part of [British law] and may not be enforced by the courts unless it has
been [enacted by Parliament]" (citing The Parliament Belge, 4 P.D. 129 (1879)
(holding a British treaty non-self-executing for the above reasoning))).
206 See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1111 (1992) (describing the longstanding rule under
British law that a treaty does not have domestic effect until Parliament enacts
implementing legislation).
207 The Framers' intention to establish treaties as law, without the need for
further legislative action, is supported not only by the unambiguous text of the
Supremacy Clause, but also by the clear record of the events that preceded its
adoption at the Constitutional Convention. One specifically rejected proposal
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agreed to the present Constitution's procedures whereby treaties
are negotiated by the Executive, thereafter are submitted to the
Senate for ratification or rejection,208 and if ratified, become the
"supreme Law of the Land" along with federal statutes, federal
common law, and the Constitution itself, and in appropriate
circumstances, are enforceable in the courts of the United States by
those who have rights thereunder.
Thereafter, a judicially inspired modification to this
constitutionally mandated principle occurred.209 It first appeared
would have required that treaties be sanctioned by legislation if they were to have
"the operation of laws." JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 597 (W. W. Norton 1987) (1840). Another would have
established two types of treaties: one requiring only action by the President and
the Senate, and a second requiring additional action by the House of
Representatives. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 538 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). In a similar vein, the Committee on Style removed
from the final version of the Supremacy Clause language that would have given
the national government the power to "enforce treaties." But the Committee
struck this language because it was redundant considering the clear language of
the Clause. Id. at 389-90. The rejection of these proposals illustrates that the
language of the Supremacy Clause was not coincidental, but rather chosen after
deliberation, and deliberately, to mean what it said.
The expectation that treaties would become operative as domestic law upon
ratification is also expressed in the Federalist Papers, and the ratification debates
within the States. For example, in Federalist No. 22, Alexander Hamilton explained
that "[tihe treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be
considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects
individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations."
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Similarly, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, one of the Constitution's
supporters explained: "It was necessary that treaties should operate as laws on
individuals. They ought to be binding upon us the moment they are made. They
involve in their nature not only our own rights, but those of foreigners [and
should be protected by the federal judiciary]." Paust, supra note 201, at 762
(quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 27 (J. Elliot ed., 1941) (1830) (documenting the
statements of William Davie, a North Carolina delegate to the Constitutional
Convention)). Even those opposing ratification shared in this view: "Brutus," in
criticizing Article III, stated that he could "readily comprehend what is meant by
deciding a case under a treaty. For as treaties will be the law of the land, every
person who have rights or privileges secured by treaty, will have of courts ... in
recovering them." 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 172 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986).
208 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. ("[The President] shall have power, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur.").
209 See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost
of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 346-47 (1995) (noting Justice Marshall's




in Foster v. Neilson,210 in which Chief Justice Marshall concluded
that the treaty in question was not self-executing because, by its
terms, it did not establish a right in the individual claimant, but
rather placed an obligation on the legislative branch to act.211 This
so-called Foster rule, to the effect that certain treaties are not self-
executing, has come into vogue in modern times, 212 particularly
with regard to human rights treaties.213  However, properly
applied, the Foster rule does not create an automatic presumption
against self-execution.214 Rather, it refers only to treaties which
210 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
211 Id. at 314-15.
212 See, e.g., Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th
Cir. 1992) (holding the Hague Convention on the laws and customs of war to be
non-self-executing and thus concluding that it does not create a private right of
action when breached)); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d
370, 373-74 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the U.N. Charter provisions stating that
all members pledge to promote the "creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples" are not self-executing and do not create individual rights); Cardenas v.
Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a treaty between the United
States and Switzerland for reciprocal assistance in criminal matters did not create
"judicially enforceable rights" for individuals because the parties did not so
intend); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(dismissing claims of Israeli victims of a PLO bus bombing on the ground that
treaties to which the United States is bound regarding human rights, laws of war,
and terrorism do not create individually enforceable rights); United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 884 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that article 6 of the Convention on
the High Seas is not self-executing and thus that the Coast Guard's Convention-
breaching seizure of a foreign vessel in international waters did not preclude
criminal prosecution in the courts of the United States). Cf. British Caledonian
Airways, Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that an
administrative order prohibiting foreign airliners must be set aside because it
violated a law Congress enacted to enforce several non-self-executing
international agreements).
213 See Henkin, supra note 209, at 348-50 (noting political efforts to undermine
treaty obligations that give rise to greater human rights obligations); see also Lori
Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and
"Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 519-23 (1991) (describing
the use of non-self-executing legislative declarations in response to human rights
treaties); David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 173 (1999)
(noting the Senate's reluctance to allow the United States to be bound by
"nonredundant" human rights obligations -human rights obligations not already
enacted into domestic law - arising from treaties).
214 Compare United States v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (stating that there is a presumption against self-executing treaties in
American law), with id. at 68 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
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from their text (or when not apparent, from their history) 215 indicate
that they are not creating a private individual right.216 Thus, the
American constitutional rule of treaty enforcement in the courts, as
modified by Foster and its progeny, requires judicial inquiry into the
terms of the treaty to determine whether the treaty is self-
executing, or more accurately, whether it creates rights that
individuals can enforce in the courts.217
Judicial inquiry aimed at determining this question is the key
phrase on this issue, particularly when considering the ICCPR and
the Senate's declaration,2 8 entered at the time of its ratification of
this treaty, purporting to establish that the substantive provisions
would not be self-executing. 219 The Senate also made several
reservations220 at that time regarding several of the ICCPR's
215 See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("In
determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the
signatory parties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the
instrument is uncertain, recourse must be had to the circumstances surrounding
its execution.").
216 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) ("The
Extradition Treaty has the force of law, and if... it is self-executing, it would
appear that a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual regardless of the
offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the other nation.").
217 See id. at 663 (stating that courts look first to a treaty's terms to determine
its contents); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1989) ("The clear
import of treaty language controls unless 'application of the words of the treaty
according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or
expectations of its signatories.'").
218 A declaration is a statement of position by the Senate that "is not
presented to the other international signatories as a request for a modification of
the treaty's terms." Igartia-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 190 (1st
Cir. 2005) (Howard, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006). "[I]t is
directed primarily towards United States courts to express 'the sense of the
Senate' that the treaty should ... be interpreted [in the manner proposed by the
Senate]." Id.
219 See S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 23 (1992) (conditioning the Senate's consent
on the United States' declaration that the treaty be non-self-executing); see also 138
CONG. REC. S4784 (1992) (documenting a letter from the President to the Senate
requesting ratification of treaty terms).
220 A reservation is a "unilateral statement ... whereby ... [a State] purports
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(d),
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. A reservation thus has an actual effect on the
terms of the treaty. See Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional Power of the United
States Senate to Condition Its Consent to Treaties, 67 Cl-.-KENT L. REV. 533, 542 n.63
(1991) (noting that in exchange for its advice and consent, the Senate can require
the President to enter a reservation to the treaty and obtain the other signatory's
consent to this change). There is no doubt that the Senate may hinge its consent to
ratify a treaty on a reservation. See Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35 (1869)
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provisions,221 but none of these reservations referred to the rights
provided for in Article 25 ("Every citizen shall have the right and
the opportunity... [t]o vote.., at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage"); 222 Article 2,
paragraph 1 (the United States "undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind... ");223 Article 2, paragraph 3 (the United
States agrees to an enforcement mechanism for the realization and
security of the rights established in the ICCPR, and undertakes
"[t]o ensure that any person whose [ICCPR] rights or freedoms...
are violated shall have an effective remedy" and to ensure that these
rights are "determined by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided
for by the legal system of the State and to develop the possibilities
of judicial remedy"); 24 or Article 2, paragraph 2:
Where not already provided for by existing legislati[on] ...
each State Party ... undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the
provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.225
The distinction between a declaration and a reservation is not one
of mere semantics. A non-self-executing declaration differs
(stating that the Senate may choose to modify or amend a treaty rather than
adopting or rejecting it in its entirety). The reservation will vitiate the Senate's
consent if its terms are not incorporated into the treaty. See Louis HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 180-81 (2d ed. 1996)
(explaining that the Senate may give its consent "subject to conditions" that "may
require renegotiation, to the dismay of Presidents").
221 See 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4783 (stating that the United States will not
take any steps to comply with ICCPR Article 20 that would infringe on the right of
free speech and association, deeming ICCPR Article 7 prohibitions against "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" to apply only to treatment
deemed "cruel and unusual" under domestic constitutional law, declining to
adhere to ICCPR Article 15, paragraph 1, and reserving the right to treat juveniles
as adults under certain circumstances, notwithstanding the provisions of ICCPR
Article 10, paragraphs 2(b) and 3, and Article 14, paragraph 4).
222 ICCPR, supra note 185, art. 25.
223 Id. art. 2, para. 1.
224 Id. art. 2, para. 3 (emphasis added).
22 Id. art. 2, para. 2 (emphasis added).
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materially from a reservation.226  As stated by two leading
commentators on this subject:
[T]he Senate lacks the constitutional authority to declare the
non-self-executing character of a treaty with binding effect
on U.S. courts. The Senate has the unicameral power only
to consent to the ratification of treaties, not to pass domestic
legislation. A declaration is not part of a treaty in the sense
of modifying the legal obligations created by it. A
declaration is merely an expression of an interpretation or
of a policy or position. U.S. courts are... not bound to
apply expressions of opinion adopted by the Senate (and
concurred in by the President). The courts must undertake
their own examination of the terms and context of each
provision in a treaty to which the United States is a party
and decide whether it is self-executing. The treaty is law.
The Senate's declaration is not law. The Senate does not have
the power to make law outside the treaty instrument.227
Stated differently, the Senate's advice and consent power under
226 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 314 cmt. d (1986) (noting that when the United States accedes to a treaty
with a reservation, this statement has domestic legal effect, whereas other
indications that the President or Senate assigned a distinct meaning to the treaty,
such as declarations, are only pertinent to treaty interpretation in "the same way
that the legislative history of a statute is relevant"); see also supra notes 215 & 217
(noting that treaty language controls unless it is inconsistent with the intent of the
treaty's signatories).
227 Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on
Parliamentary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 293, 296-97 (1991) (emphasis added); see HENKIN, supra note 201, at 202
(describing the Senate's practice of declaring treaties non-self-executing as "'anti-
Constitutional' in spirit"); Henkin, supra note 209, at 346 (arguing that non-self-
execution declarations by the Senate may be unconstitutional); see also Cinotti,
supra note 196, at 1291 (contending that "the President and the Senate do not have
constitutional authority to make a non-self-execution declaration legally
binding"); Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-
Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257,
1265 (1993) (quoting with approval the International Law Association's statement
that it "may well be that a non-self-executing declaration.., does not bind the
judicial branch"); John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1298 (1993) (arguing that
courts, rather than the Senate, should determine whether or not a treaty is non-
self-executing); Charles H. Dearborn, III, Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of
Declarations that Treaty Provisions Are Not Self -Executing, 57 TEX. L. REV. 233, 251
(1979) (arguing that declarations might be "an invalid attempt by the Senate to




Article II, section 2,228 extends only to the making of reservations
that require changes to treaties before the Senate's consent will be
effected. A declaration that has domestic effect is, in reality, an
attempt to legislate concerning the internal implementation of a
treaty. But the power to legislate is not granted to the Senate under
Article II. Legislation may only be enacted through bicameral
adoption and presentation to the President as set forth in Article
1.229 Not only is there virtually unanimous academic agreement on
this point,23 0 the only case decided supports this conclusion.
In Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Commission,231
the D.C. Circuit held that a "reservation" by the Senate in a
bilateral treaty with Canada was ineffective because the
reservation only involved U.S. domestic law.232 For the reservation
to be binding on the judiciary, the court reasoned, it had to
constitute an actual part of the treaty:
A true reservation which becomes part of a treaty is one
which alters "the effect of the treaty in so far as it may
apply in the relations of [the] State with the other State or
States which may be parties to the treaty." It creates "a
different relationship between" the parties and varies "the
obligations of the parties proposing it."233
Because the reservation was merely an expression of the
Senate's view of domestic policy, it was not part of the treaty and
thus did not become domestic law under the Supremacy Clause,
thereby binding the courts. 2
34
228 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 1 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds
of the Senators present concur .... ).
229 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983).
23 See sources cited supra note 227.
231 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
232 Id. at 541. Although called a "reservation" in the opinion, as will be seen
from the discussion of this case, the court is actually talking about a declaration.
See id. (calling the Senate's statement a "reservation" but noting that the statement
"made no change in the treaty" and was "not a counter-offer").
233 Id. at 541 (internal citation omitted).
234 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), is not to the contrary. In that
case, the issue was whether the right to be free from arbitrary abduction and
detention was protected under customary international law. The plaintiff did not
sue directly under the ICCPR, but rather argued that the ICCPR's terms helped
establish the relevant principle of customary international law for purposes of his
Alien Tort Statute claim. The Court relied on the Senate's non-self-execution
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5.2. The ICCPR and the Courts
There should be little doubt that the non-self-execution
declaration in the ICCPR is merely an expression by the Senate
concerning a purely domestic issue, and like the reservation in
Power Authority, did not modify the law (i.e., the ICCPR), and thus
lacks binding force. Although the Senate's views are relevant to
the interpretation of the treaty, 235 whether there is a private right of
action under the ICCPR should be decided by the courts on the
basis of the totality of the available evidence.
236
There is no need to go further than the unequivocal language of
the ICCPR to conclude that it is a classic self-executing treaty
which creates individual substantive rights enforceable in the
courts of the United States. 237 To begin with, paragraph 1 of Article
2 requires the United States "to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized" in the
ICCPR.238 Under Article 2, paragraph 3, subparagraph (a), there is
declaration in the ICCPR as one factor to support its conclusion that the ICCPR
could not, by itself, establish a rule of customary international law. But the Court
was not faced with (nor did it decide) the question of whether the Senate's
declaration ipso facto prevents a plaintiff from suing directly under the ICCPR.
Because the question in Sosa was not the binding effect of the Senate's non-self-
execution declaration in determining whether the ICCPR establishes a private
cause of action, the parties did not present the Court with (and it did not address)
the separation of powers arguments questioning the Senate's authority to issue
such declarations. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the United States at 9, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339).
235 See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366-67 (1989) (looking to
Senate reports and floor debates to aid in interpreting the Convention between the
United States and Canada Respecting Double Taxation of 1942).
236 See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700
(1988) ("Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to
ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of
the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
parties.") (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-
32 (1943)); Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 482 U.S.
522, 534 (1987) (stating that treaty interpretation begins with the text of the treaty,
but that the treaty's history and practical construction adopted by the parties are
relevant); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985) (stating that "[i]n
interpreting a treaty it is proper . . . to refer to the records of its drafting and
negotiation"); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.
1985) (explaining that the most important factor in determining whether a treaty
is self-executing is the language, purpose, and intent behind the treaty).
237 See generally Paust, supra note 227 (arguing that, based on the treaty's
language, rights to remedies are not dependent on future implementing
legislation).
238 ICCPR, supra note 185, art. 2, para. 1.
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THE INSULAR CASES
an obligation on each signatory "[t]o ensure that any person whose
rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an
effective remedy."239  Subparagraph (b) thereof sets forth the
obligation "[t]o ensure that any person claiming such a remedy
shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent
authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop [further] possibilities of judicial remedy." 240 Finally, it is
important to note that at the time of ratification the United States
made the representation that "existing U.S. law generally complies
with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not
contemplated." 241 It would seem that the United States' intention,
consistent with the aforementioned language of the ICCPR, was to
allow individuals access to the courts without the need for
additional national legislation.
Although the discussion of whether there is an individual
cause of action to enforce the ICCPR in the courts of the United
States is an interesting academic and legal question, and official
resistance to such constitutes corroborative evidence on the
underlying attitudes that have supported the United States'
colonial stance, for present purposes these are issues that are
secondary to the principal theme under discussion. The main
point is that the United States has become a party to the ICCPR
and other similar international agreements, and thereby has
announced and committed itself to treat all of its citizens equally.
This, of course, is in addition to what the letter and ethos of the
Constitution already speak to and require of the United States in its
relationship to its citizens.
Unfortunately, we are faced with the undeniable fact that, at
least as to the U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico and the other
territories, the United States has failed and continues to fail in its
fiduciary duty as parens patriae of all of its citizens to live up to its
aforementioned commitments. This failure inevitably emanates
from the continued adherence by the United States to the words
and spirit of the Insular Cases and their progeny.
239 Id. art. 2, para. 3. (emphasis added).
240 Id. (emphasis added).
241 S. EXEC. REP. No. 23, at 19 (1992) (emphasis added); see also id. at 10 ("In
general, the substantive provisions of the Covenant are consistent with the letter
and spirit of the United States Constitution, and laws, both state and federal.").
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
As has become apparent, the Insular Cases were wrongly
decided. They contravened established doctrine that was based on
sound constitutional principles, substituting binding jurisprudence
with theories that were unsupported in our traditions or system of
government and which were specifically created to meet the
political and racial agendas of the times. The basis on which they
were premised-that the United States could hold territories and
their inhabitants in a colonial status indefinitely - was
unprecedented in our history and unauthorized by our
Constitution. The interpretation given to the Constitution by the
Insular Cases and Balzac, permitting the perpetuation, without
limitation, of a subclass of United States citizens unequal in rights
to the rest of the body politic, is a constitutional incongruity that is
unsupportable morally, logically, or legally.
Furthermore, whatever underpinnings may have existed for
these cases at the time they were decided have been totally eroded
since then. If there was a justification dictated by the historical
period in which they came about, this justification is no longer
available. Plessy has been reversed by Brown,242 making racial
discrimination legally and ethically unacceptable. Discrimination
on the basis of locality makes as much sense as such opprobrious conduct
based on race, and therefore should also be discarded as a constitutional
principle.
Puerto Rico is part of the First Circuit, and a United States court
of appeals sits in Puerto Rico several times a year and exercises
Article III powers while there. An Article III district court now sits
in Puerto Rico with the same jurisdiction as other Article III district
courts throughout the nation,243 and provides nearly one-third of
the appellate case work of the First Circuit. One of the appeals
judges on that court resides in Puerto Rico, and sits and decides
cases of general federal application, yet does not, while in Puerto
Rico, have the same civil and political rights as the other judges on
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. How can the
Constitution be applied in such a balkanized, arbitrary, and
242 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
243 Act of Sept. 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764 (1966) (codified at 28




irrational manner? The language of the Constitution is "too plain
and unambiguous to permit its meaning to be thus influenced." 244
By its repeated decisions upholding the Insular Cases and their
progeny, the Supreme Court has created what amounts to a
political ghetto in the territories, from which there is no escape or
solution by its inhabitants because they lack the political power to
influence the political institutions that can make the necessary
changes to this situation. Puerto Rico's U.S. citizens have no
effective way of exercising the political pressure that is normally
available to U.S. citizens residing in the States on the political
branches of the national government, where all the fundamental
decisions affecting Puerto Rico are made. Thus, the judicial
posture commonly expounded, to the effect that these are issues
that must be resolved through political means, is flawed ab initio
because, in the case of the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico, no effective
political means exist to correct their colonial condition. The claim
of "political question" in the case of Puerto Rico is a flagrant
subterfuge to avoid taking the action that has been sanctioned by
the Supreme Court as appropriate when extreme circumstances are
presented of a pervasive deficit in the democratic processes: when
courts are faced with a refusal of the political branches to correct
the abuses against a discrete group of citizens that is completely
under the sovereignty of the United States, the courts are required
to act to correct those abuises.245
Over one hundred years of denigrating colonial status should
be sufficient evidence of the need for judicial action. The Supreme
Court, as it did with Plessy, must step forward to correct the wrong
it created by sanctioning the Insular Cases and their progeny. The
continued vitality of these cases represents a constitutional
antediluvian anachronism that has created a de jure and de facto
condition of political apartheid for the U.S. citizens that reside in
Puerto Rico and the other territories.
244 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 374 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
245 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
("[Pirejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
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